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A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging
in Hindsight
Jeffrey J. Rachlinskit
Nothing is so easy as to be wise after the event.'
Everyone is familiar with the feeling that they "knew-it-all-
along." Events, especially tragedies, often feel as if they were
predictable. Folk wisdom admonishes us to distrust this sensa-
tion. We all know that hindsight vision is "20/20" and that "Mon-
day morning quarterbacking" exaggerates one's ability to know
the future. Learning how the story ends makes the outcome seem
inevitable and predictable, thereby distorting our perception of
what could have been predicted. Despite this well-known obstacle
to assessing the predictability of events accurately, the law con-
stantly requires courts to make such assessments. Numerous le-
gal judgments, from determining whether a tort defendant failed
to take reasonable care to whether a corporate officer committed
securities fraud by knowingly making false statements, require
that a judge or jury ignore what they have learned in hindsight.
If the folk wisdom is correct, these judgments should be dis-
trusted. Our legal system apparently relies on faulty judgments.
Research by cognitive psychologists supports the folk admo-
nition against trusting judgments made in hindsight. Beginning
with the work of Baruch Fischhoff, psychologists have demon-
strated repeatedly that people overstate the predictability of past
events2 -a phenomenon that psychologists have termed the
"hindsight bias." Fischhoff described the bias as follows:
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2 See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight # Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J Exp Psych 288 (1975) (first describing the effect). For
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In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have
been anticipated in foresight. They not only tend to view
what has happened as having been inevitable but also to
view it as having appeared 'relatively inevitable' before it
happened. People believe that others should have been able
to anticipate events much better than was actually the case
The hindsight bias clearly has implications for the legal sys-
tem. Consider, for example, the dilemma of a defendant who, de-
spite taking reasonable care, has caused an accident and has
been sued. The defendant's level of care will be reviewed by a
judge or jury who already knows that it proved inadequate to
avoid the plaintiff's injury. Consequently, the defendant's level of
care will seem less reasonable in hindsight than it did in fore-
sight.4 Reasonableness must be determined from the perspective
of the defendant at the time that the precautions were taken, but
the hindsight bias ensures that subsequent events will influence
that determination. The law relies on a process that assigns li-
ability in a biased manner.
So why does the law tolerate the presence of the hindsight
bias? The hindsight bias is well-understood, and the courts en-
counter it on a daily basis. Is it possible that the legal system de-
liberately relies upon faulty judgments? The potential conse-
quences of the hindsight bias make this question even more trou-
blesome. The bias, in general, makes defendants appear more
culpable than they really are.5 The bias can cause judges and ju-
ries to find liable even those defendants who attempted to avoid
negligence by undertaking all reasonable precautions in fore-
sight. Not only does this seem unjust, but it also might have ad-
verse economic consequences. Any potential defendant who is
aware of the implications of the hindsight bias might try to avoid
liability by taking an excess of precautions. The hindsight bias
thus suggests a problem with the law and economics of negli-
reviews of research on the hindsight bias, see Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski and Cynthia
Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-analysis, 48 Org Beh & Human Decision
Processes 147, 147-48 (1991); Scott A. Hawkins and Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased
Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 Psych Bull 311, 312 (1990).
' Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in
Hindsight, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment under
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases 335, 341 (Cambridge 1982) (offering a thorough analy-
sis of potential causes of the bias).
' See Kim A. Kamin and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: Determining Liabil-
ity in Hindsight, 19 L & Human Beh 89, 101 (1995) (studying What effect the bias has on a
"courtroom" liability determination).
' The bias also might affect a factfinder's judgment of a plaintiff's actions. See Part
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gence. If, as many law and economics scholars posit, the common
law evolves towards efficiency,6 then why does it tolerate biased
judgments that create inefficiency? The puzzle goes beyond eco-
nomics, however. Liability judged in hindsight penalizes people
who endeavor to comply with what the law requires of them. The
law seems to have settled upon a method of determining liability
that is neither efficient nor fair.
In fact, the law is not blind to the influence of the hindsight
bias. Many judicial opinions explicitly recognize the prejudicial
aspects of judging in hindsight,7 but the influence of the hindsight
bias is difficult to avoid. The bias is caused by a deeply ingrained
cognitive process, as well as significant motivational forces. Con-
sequently, attempts to restructure decisions made in hindsight so
as to avoid the bias have all failed to eliminate its influence. This
conclusion suggests that a generic, one-size-fits-all remedy for
20/20 judgment in hindsight is unlikely to be available to the le-
gal system. Even though courts recognize the presence of the
bias, a solution to it might remain elusive.
Furthermore, there might not be an overwhelming need to
correct for the hindsight bias. The impact of the bias on both effi-
ciency and fairness is less destructive than it seems at first
glance. If the bias induces judges and juries to hold liable defen-
dants who actually took reasonable care, then it converts a negli-
gence rule into a rule of strict liability. The situation is slightly
more complicated than this, as defendants can probably still
avoid liability altogether by taking far more precautions than
reasonable care requires, but the resemblance is close. Although
strict liability and negligence do have different economic conse-
quences, strict liability does not create incentives for potential de-
fendants to undertake an excess of precautions. Thus, the hind-
sight bias does not necessarily have adverse economic conse-
quences. As to fairness, although adopting a negligence rule that
nevertheless holds people strictly liable seems unjust, the injus-
tice is hard to spot in an individual case. The judge, jury, plain-
tiff, and even the defendant view the events after the fact, and so
holding a defendant liable may seem like the right result. In fact,
a correction for the hindsight bias might seem unfair to the plain-
" See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 559-60 (Little, Brown 4th ed
1992); John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J Legal
Stud 393, 394 (1978); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Ef-
ficient Rules, 6 J Legal Stud 65, 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Effi-
cient? 6 J Legal Stud 51, 53 (1977). See generally Jack Hirshleifer, ed, Epolutionary Mod-
els in Economics and Law, 4 Research in L & Econ 1 (1982).
' See Part IV.B.3.
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tiff, because everyone in the courtroom believes that the defen-
dant was actually negligent.
Despite calls for reforms to eliminate the influence of the
hindsight bias,' courts have already done a remarkable job of
adapting to the limitations of human judgment in hindsight.
They have avoided adopting generic solutions that psychological
research predicts would be unsuccessful. Instead, the courts have
developed rules that take advantage of specific opportunities to
avoid the bias. For example, when a reliable ex ante assessment
of reasonable care is available, such as custom in medical mal-
practice, courts rely on it rather than their own independent as-
sessment of reasonable care. Rules that avoid the more pernicious
aspects of the bias have also developed: rules such as the inad-
missibility of subsequent remedial measures as evidence of negli-
gence.'
In many circumstances, however, no mechanism to avoid or
reduce the influence of the hindsight bias is available and the law
must pursue some second-best course of action. It must tolerate
biased assessments of liability or create some form of immunity
for potential defendants. For example, in corporate law, the busi-
ness judgment rule protects corporate officers and directors from
liability for negligent business decisions because, in part, of the
tendency for adverse outcomes to seem inevitable. There is no
such immunity for ordinary defendants in negligence, who must
tolerate biased assessments of liability. Both rules are second
best to using accurate assessments of negligence in hindsight.
The business judgment rule leaves shareholders subject to the
negligence of corporate managers. The tort system leaves defen-
dants subject to the overattributions of fault that hindsight pro-
duces, leading to unfairness and possibly creating inefficient in-
centives. The differences between the two areas of law can be ex-
plained by the underlying differences in the activities combined
with an understanding of the hindsight bias.'0 Because the bias
converts negligence into a kind of strict liability, liability for neg-
ligence would exacerbate corporate managers' tendency to be
more cautious than shareholders want. The analysis in this Arti-
cle shows that this biased assessment of liability does not have
such a pernicious impact on the behavior of other types of profes-
sionals.
' See, for example, Hal R Arkes and Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the
Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 Or L Rev 587, 630 (1994) (ar-
guing for a change in medical malpractice rules in order to eliminate the hindsight bias).
See text accompanying notes 201-06.
10 See Arkes and Schipani, 73 Or L Rev at 621-29.
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Judicial opinions display a terrific understanding of the im-
plications of a biased assessment of liability. Rules have evolved
that reduce the bias's impact, and when its influence cannot be
purged, sensible second-best rules have emerged. The law has
adapted well to the fallibility of human judgment. As a conse-
quence, understanding the hindsight bias is also critical to un-
derstanding the law.
This thesis represents a perspective on the nature of cogni-
tive biases in law that differs markedly both from the law and
economics and from the law and psychology traditions. Law and
economics theorists tend to regard cognitive biases as phenomena
that are either overstated or are weeded out by market forces."
Law and psychology has a tradition of criticizing the legal system
for ignoring the findings of modern psychology. 2 In the case of
the hindsight bias, neither perspective is accurate. Every piece of
evidence suggests that the bias has an important effect on judg-
ments of liability in the legal system, 3 and a careful analysis
suggests that the legal system already incorporates an under-
standing of the bias's implications.
This Article develops the thesis that the law reflects an un-
derstanding of the hindsight bias. In Part I, it describes the psy-
chological research on judging in hindsight, with special attention
to the sources and explanations for the hindsight bias. Part II
discusses the application of the hindsight bias to judgments of li-
ability and fault in the legal system and concludes that the bias
has a big impact on judgments of liability. Part III analyzes the
consequences of this phenomenon for the legal system. Part IV
" See, for example, Daniel S. Levy and David Friedman, The Revenge of the Red-
woods?: Reconsidering Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources,
61 U Chi L Rev 493, 512-16 (1994) (arguing that the challenge that a cognitive bias known
as the endowment effect poses to rational choice theory is overstated); Jonathan R Macey,
Packaged Preferences and the Institutional Transformation of Interests, 61 U Chi L Rev
1443, 1448-49 (1994) (arguing that market forces pressure organizations to create mecha-
nisms that avoid cognitive biases).
See Shari Seidman Diamond, Foreword, in D.K. Kagehiro and W.S. Laufer, Hand-
book of Psychology and Law v, vi-vii (Springer-Verlag 1992) ("In some... cases, the courts
have ignored, distorted, or rejected psychological findings."); Wallace D. Loh, In Quest of
Brown's Promise: Social Research and Social Values in School Desegregation, 58 Wash L
Rev 129, 171 (1982) (book review) (comparing the way courts use social science to "the way
a drunk uses a lamppost: for support rather than illumination"); John Monahan and
Laurens Walker, Social Science Research in Law: A New Paradigm, 43 Am Psych 465, 465
(1988) ("[Psychologists] repeatedly complain that their research is either ignored or mis-
construed."). See generally Michael J. Saks and Charles H. Baron, eds, The
Use/Nonuse/Misuse of Applied Social Research in the Courts 28-56 (Abt 1980) (docu-
menting courts' abuse of legitimate research methods).
' See Part H.
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documents the adaptations that the legal system has developed to
accommodate the hindsight bias, and Part V states conclusions.
I. PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON JUDGING N HINDSIGHT
A. What Is the Hindsight Bias?
Research by cognitive psychologists has shown that the folk
wisdom on hindsight is correct-past events seem more predict-
able than they really were. Baruch Fischhoff provided the first
systematic demonstration of this phenomenon.14 In his study,
Fischhoff gave undergraduate subjects a description of an unfa-
miliar, nineteenth century war between the British and the Nep-
alese Gurkhas. 5 His materials consisted of a 150-word descrip-
tion of the conflict, including the strengths and weaknesses of
each army. This description listed four possible outcomes of the
conflict (British victory, Gurkha victory, stalemate with no peace
settlement, and stalemate with a peace settlement). The remain-
der of Fischhoff's materials split into five different conditions.
The materials either stated that one of the four possible outcomes
had actually occurred or provided no information about the actual
outcome. Subjects read the materials and then answered the fol-
lowing question: "In light of the information appearing in the
passage, what was the probability of occurrence of each of the
four possible outcomes... [?] ' Subjects who were told that one
of the outcomes had occurred made inflated estimates of the ex
ante likelihood of that outcome (as compared with subjects who
were given no information about the outcome). In fact, the mean
probabilities that subjects assigned to the supposed outcome of
the conflict summed to 170 percent, whereas they would have
summed to approximately 100 percent if knowing the outcome
had not influenced the subjects. In this study, and in the replica-
tions that Fischhoff ran with other scenarios, providing subjects
with an outcome increased their estimates of the likelihood of
that outcome by between 6.3 and 44.0 percentage points.17
It is important to distinguish between the hindsight bias and
the more ordinary process of learning from experience. In most
" Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 288 (cited in note 2). The literature credits Fischhoff
with first identifying the bias and coining the term "hindsight bias." See Stephen J. Hoch
and George F. Loewenstein, Outcome Feedback: Hindsight and Information, 15 J Exp
Psych: Learning, Memory, & Cognition 605, 605 (1989). But an earlier article on a differ-
ent subject also describes the same phenomenon. See Elaine Walster, 'Second Guessing'
Important Events, 20 Human Rel 239, 244-49 (1967).
"Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 289-90 (cited in note 2).
16 Id at 289.
'7 Id at 291.
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circumstances, learning an outcome should cause people to up-
date their estimates of an event's likelihood. 8 If Fischhoff had
asked his subjects to estimate the probabilities of the possible
outcomes of a future conflict between the British and the Gurk-
has, it would have been appropriate for the subjects to suppose
that history might repeat itself. Fischhoff did not ask his subjects
to predict a future event, however; he asked them to judge the
predictability of past events as if they were ignorant of the known
outcome. His subjects behaved as if they were supposed to learn
from the outcome, even though that was not their chore.
Determining the predictability of once-future events is a
somewhat unnatural undertaking," but Fischhoff's findings are
not merely the product of his subjects' confusion. Using compara-
ble materials, Fischhoff provided subjects with an outcome and
then asked them to estimate the probability that other subjects,
who were not informed of the outcome, would have assigned to
each possible outcome. ° This explicitly required the subjects to
try to see the world through the eyes of those who did not know
how the events unfolded; however, they were unable to do so.
These subjects provided the same biased assessments of what
was predictable as did subjects in Fischhoff's first study.2'
Furthermore, other studies have demonstrated not only that
people claim that they would have known it all along, but also
that they maintain that they did, in fact, know it all along.' Re-
searchers asked subjects to estimate the likelihood of the outcome
of some imminent event (such as an election) and then, some time
after the event, asked the same subjects to remember their esti-
mates. Although subjects in these studies often correctly recalled
their initial estimates, when they erred, they tended to believe
that they had assigned higher estimates to the actual outcomes
than they originally did. Dozens of researchers have replicated
Fischhoff's findings using both the "I would have predicted it"
See Hoch and Loewenstein, 15 J Exp Psych at 605 (cited in note 14) (discussing pat-
terns of learning from experience).
"See Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in Kabneman, Slovic, and Tversky, eds, Judgment
under uncertainty 422, 428-29 (cited in note 3).
20 Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 295-97 (cited in note 2).
21 Id at 296-97.
See Hawkins and Hastie, 107 Psych Bull at 314-15 (cited in note 3). One recent arti-
cle, however, has argued that the hindsight bias observed in studies using this method re-
sults from a different process than the hindsight bias observed in studies using
Fischhoff's original methodology. Ralph Hertwig, Gerd Gigerenzer, and Ulrich Hoffirage,
The Reiteration Effect in Hindsight Bias, 104 Psych Rev 194, 201 (1997).
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and the "I did predict it" methods. The hindsight bias is not the
unique product of an unusual research methodology2
Researchers also have used a wide range of different materi-
als to document the hindsight bias. Many studies in addition to
Fischhoff's original work have replicated his results with historic
events, including everything from Nixon's visit to China in 1972
to the riots that followed the verdict in the first Rodney King
case.' In other studies, researchers have found that subjects also
rate the outcome of more ordinary events, such as whether a
business would be successful, as more predictable than they are.'
' See Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 48 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes
at 150 (cited in note 2) (observing that, as of 1990, there were 128 studies documenting the
hindsight bias).
See Baruch Fischhoff and Ruth Beyth, I Knew It Would Happen: Remembered
Probabilities of Once-Future Things, 13 Org Beh & Human Performance 1, 3 (1975)
(Nixon's 1972 diplomatic missions to China and Russia); Lee J. Gilbertson, et al, A Study
of Hindsight Bias: The Rodney King Case in Retrospect, 74 Psych Rep 383, 384 (1994)
(consequences of verdict in the first Rodney King case); Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 289
(cited in note 2) (near riot in Atlanta); Mark R. Leary, The Distorted Nature of Hindsight,
115 J Soc Psych 25, 27 (1981) (college football game); Donald C. Pennington, The British
fireman's strike of 1977/78: An investigation of judgments in foresight and hindsight, 20
Brit J Soc Psych 89, 90-91 (1981) (a fireman's strike in Great Britain); David Wasserman,
Richard 0. Lempert, and Reid Hastie, Hindsight and Causality, 17 Personality & Soc
Psych Bull 30, 32 (1991) (the same British-Gurkha materials that Fischhoff used). Several
studies have used elections. Mark R. Leary, Hindsight Distortion and the 1980 Presiden-
tial Election, 8 Personality & Soc Psych Bull 257, 259-60 (1982) (1980 presidential elec-
tion); Donald C. Pennington, Being Wise after the Event: an Investigation of Hindsight
Bias, 1 Current Psych Res 271, 273 (1981) (British general election of 1979); Jack L. Pow-
ell, A Test of the Knew-It-All-Along Effect in the 1984 Presidential and Statewide Elections,
18 J Applied Soc Psych 760, 762-63 (1988) (1984 presidential and Missouri state elec-
tions); Nicolaos E. Synodinos, Hindsight Distortion: 'I knew-it-all along and I was sure
about it" , 16 J Applied Soc Psych 107, 109-14 (1986) (1982 Hawaiian gubernatorial elec-
tion).
' See Clifton E. Brown and Ira Solomon, Effects of Outcome Information on Evalua-
tions of Managerial Decisions, 62 Acct Rev 564, 568-75 (1987) (likely success of a new
business venture); Richard S. Brown, Christopher W. Williams, and Paul R. Lees-Haley,
The Effects of Hindsight Bias and Causal Attribution on Human Response to Environ-
mental Events, 24 J Applied Soc Psych 661, 664-65 (1994) (outcome knowledge effect on
responses to hazardous waste disposal); Thomas A. Buchman, An Effect of Hindsight on
Predicting Bankruptcy with Accounting Information, 10 Acct Org & Soc 267, 274 (1985)
(predicting a bankruptcy); Edward W. Bukszar and Terry Connolly, Hindsight Bias and
Strategic Choice: Some Problems in Learning from Experience, 31 Acad Mgmt J 628, 630-
31 (1988) (predicting the success or failure of a new business); Colleen K. Cannon and
Vernon L. Quinsey, The Likelihood of Violent Behavior: Predictions, Postdictions, and
Hindsight Bias, 27 Canadian J Beh Sci 92, 94-95 (1995) (the likelihood of a violent of-
fender recidivating); Terry Connolly and Edward W. Bukszar, Hindsight Bias: Self-
Flattery or Cognitive Error?, 3 J Beh Decision Making 205, 207 (1990) (predicting the suc-
cess or failure of a new business); Walster, 20 Human Rel at 240 (cited in note 14) (the
consequences of purchasing a house); Rami Zwick, Rik Pieters, and Hans Baumgartner,
On the Practical Significance of Hindsight Bias: The Case of Expectancy-Disconfirmation
Model of Consumer Satisfaction, 64 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes 103, 105 (1995)
(the expected quality of consumer products). In several studies, subjects rated the predict-
ability of the outcome of social psychological experiments. Martin F. Davies, Reduction of
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Still other studies have demonstrated that the hindsight bias
makes significant personal events, especially tragedies, seem
predictable."6
The bias is not limited to specific populations of subjects, ei-
ther. Although most of the hindsight studies have relied on col-
lege undergraduates in the United States, several have used stu-
dents in other countries,27 and a few have used populations other
than undergraduates.' Studies even have demonstrated that the
bias influences the judgments of experts in several different
Hindsight Bias by Restoration of Foresight Perspective: Effectiveness of Foresight-Encoding
and Hindsight-Retrieval Strategies, 40 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes 50, 53
(1987); Martin F. Davies, Field-Dependence and Hindsight Bias: Output Interference in the
Generation of Reasons, 27 J Res Personality 222, 278-80 (1993); Paul Slovic and Baruch
Fischhoff, On the Psychology of Experimental Surprises, 3 J Exp Psych: Human Perception
& Performance 544, 545-46 (1977); Dagmar Stahlberg, et al, We Knew It All Along: Hind-
sight Bias in Groups, 63 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes 46, 51-52 (1995).
' See Robert P. Agans and Leigh S. Shaffer, The Hindsight Bias: The Role of the
Availability Heuristic and Perceived Risk, 15 Basic & Applied Soc Psych 439, 444 (1994)
(being the victim of a homicide or a car accident); Linda L. Carli and Jean Brown Leonard,
The Effect of Hindsight on Victim Derogation, 8 J Soc & Clinical Psych 331, 334-35 (1989)
(likelihood of becoming the victim of a rape); Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 289 (cited in note
2) (outcome of treatment for psychiatric patients); William C. Goggin and Lillian M.
Range, The Disadvantages of Hindsight in the Perception of Suicide, 3 J Soc & Clinical
Psych 232, 233 (1985) (likelihood that another will commit suicide); Nick Haslam and Ni-
mali Jayasinghe, Negative Affect and Hindsight Bias, 8 J Beh Decision Making 127, 129
(1995) (predicting own score on a midterm exam); Melvin M. Mark and Steven Mellor, Ef-
fect of Self-Relevance of an Event on Hindsight Bias: The Foreseeability of a Layoff, 76 J
Applied Psych 569, 570-71 (1991) (being laid off from work); Michelle R. Nario and Nyla R.
Branscombe, Comparison Processes in Hindsight and Causal Attribution, 21 Personality &
Soc Psych Bull 1244, 1246-47 (1995) (dying in a plane crash); Donald C. Pennington, et al,
Estimating the outcome of a pregnancy test: Women's judgments in foresight and hindsight,
19 Brit J Soc & Clinical Psych 317, 318-19 (1980) (outcome of a pregnancy test); Neal J.
Roese and James M. Olson, Counterfactuals, Causal Attributions, and the Hindsight Bias:
A Conceptual Integration, 32 J Exp Soc Psych 197, 204-05 (1996) (someone else's score on
a midterm exam).
"See Cannon and Quinsey, 27 Canadian J Beh Sci at 94 (cited in note 25) (Canada);
Davies, 40 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes at 53 (cited in note 25) (England); Da-
vies, 27 J Res Personality at 224 (England); Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 289 (cited in note
2) (Israel); Wolfgang Hell, et al, Hindsight Bias: An Interaction of Automatic and Motiva-
tional Factors?, 16 Memory & Cognition 533, 535 (1988) (Germany); Pennington, 1 Cur-
rent Psych Res at 273 (cited in note 24) (England); Rudiger F. Pohl and Wolfgang Hell, No
Reduction in Hindsight Bias After Complete Information and Repeated Testing, 67 Org
Beh & Human Decision Processes 49, 51 (1996) (Germany); Donald Sharpe and John G.
Adair, Reversibility of the Hindsight Bias: Manipulation of Experimental Demands, 56 Org
Beh & Human Decision Processes 233, 236-37 (1993) (Canada); Stahlberg, et al, 63 Org
Beh & Human Decision Processes at 51 (Germany).
" See Mark and Mellor, 76 J Applied Pysch at 571 (cited in note 26) (union members
in a Northeastern industrial area); Pennington, 1 Current Psych Res at 273 (cited in note
24) (active members of Tory and Labour Parties in England); Pennington, et al, 19 Brit J
Soc & Clinical Psych at 319 (adult women in England).
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fields. 9 Two studies have shown that even state and federal
judges are susceptible to the bias.30
Virtually every study on judging in hindsight has concluded
that events seem more predictable than they actually are."1 The
research on judging in hindsight, taken as a whole, strongly sup-
ports Fischhoff's conclusion that "[flinding out that an outcome
has occurred increases its perceived likelihood."32 "The over-
whelming verdict.., is that the hindsight bias is a robust phe-
nomenon that is not easily eliminated or even moderated."33
"See John C. Anderson, D. Jordan Lowe, and Philip M.J. Reckers, Evaluation of
auditor decisions: Hindsight bias effects and the expectation gap, 14 J Econ Psych 711, 722
(1993) (professional auditors and state and federal judges); Hal I. Arkes, et al, Eliminat-
ing the Hindsight Bias, 73 J Applied Psych 305, 306 (1988) (neuropsychologists); Hal X.
Arkes, et al, Hindsight Bias Among Physicians Weighing the Likelihood of Diagnoses, 66 J
Applied Psych 252, 252-53 (1981) (medical doctors); Don E. Detmer, et al, Heuristics and
Biases in Medical Decision-Making, 53 J Med Educ 682, 682 (1978) (university surgeons);
Raanon Lipshitz and Dalya Barak, Hindsight wisdom: Outcome knowledge and the
evaluation of decisions, 88 Acta Psychologica 105, 110 (1995) (officers in the Israeli De-
fense Force); Terence R. Mitchell and Laura S. Kalb, Effects of Outcome Knowledge and
Outcome Valence on Supervisors' Evaluations, 66 J Applied Psych 604, 605 (1981) (gradu-
ate nursing students). Several studies use advanced business school students. Buchman,
10 Acct Org & Soc at 270 (cited in note 25); Bukszar and Connolly, 31 Acad Mgmt J at 630
(cited in note 25); Connolly and Bukszar, 3 J Beh Decision Making at 207 (cited in note
25); Hoch and Loewenstein, 15 J Exp Psych at 610 (cited in note 14).
' Anderson, Lowe, and Reckers, 14 J Econ Psych at 722-30; Marianne M. Jennings, D.
Jordan Lowe, and Philip M.J. Reckers, Outcome Foreseeability and its Effects on Judicial
Decisions (unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev).
" Two studies reported a "reverse" hindsight bias. David Mazursky and Chezy Ofir, "I
Could Never Have Expected It to Happen": The Reversal of the Hindsight Bias, 46 Org Beh
& Human Decision Processes 20, 25-31 (1990) (People rating low-quality consumer prod-
ucts mistakenly recall that their initial expectations were better than they in fact were.);
Bas Verplanken and Rik G.M. Pieters, Individual Differences in Reverse Hindsight Bias: I
Never Thought Something Like Chernobyl Would Happen. Did I?, 1 J Beh Decision Mak-
ing 131, 14041 (1988) (Subjects made lower estimates of the likelihood that a nuclear ac-
cident causing ten thousand or more casualties would occur in the next ten years five
months after the Chernobyl nuclear accident than they did beforehand.). The interpreta-
tions of the data in these studies have been criticized, however, and, in fact, both studies
probably supported the existence of the hindsight bias. See Hal R. Arkes, Commentary on
the Article by Verplanken and Pieters, 1 J Beh Decision Making 146, 146 (1988) (conclud-
ing that since Chernobyl did not produce more than ten thousand casualties, Verplanken
and Pieter's results actually support the hindsight bias); Melvin M. Mark and Steven
Mellor, 'We Don't Expect it Happened: On Mazursky and Ofir's (1990) Purported Reversal
of the Hindsight Bias, 57 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes 247, 249-51 (1994) (pro-
viding several alternative explanations for the results of Mazursky and Ofir). But see Bas
Verplanken and Rik Pieters, A second look at hindsight, 1 J Beh Decision Making 147, 147
(1988) (defending the results of their earlier study). Similarly, a few studies have also re-
ported conditions that elicited no statistically significant bias. See, for example, Agans and
Shaffer, 15 Basic & Applied Soc Psych at 445-46 (cited in note 26) (finding that the pre-
dicted likelihood of a smoker contracting lung cancer was the same for both hindsight and
foresight subjects). But an occasional failure to find the bias should be expected among
such a large number of studies.
Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 297 (cited in note 2).
Hoch and Loewenstein, 15 J Exp Psych at 606 (cited in note 14).
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Thus, across a wide variety of tasks, materials, and populations,
a sizeable' and consistent bias clouds judgments made in hind-
sight.
The hindsight bias also is related closely to a phenomenon
known as the "outcome bias.""5 This refers to the tendency to base
assessments of a decision's quality on its consequences." Because
the hindsight bias increases the perceived likelihood of a known
outcome, it makes decisionmakers appear as if they used inap-
propriate probability estimates. The outcome, however, also has a
direct influence on the perceived quality of a decision, even apart
from the outcome's impact on perceived probabilities-which is
evidence of an outcome bias independent of the hindsight bias.
When decisions turn out badly, people assume that decisionmak-
ers made poor choices.3
"One review estimated that in those studies that are the most relevant to the legal
system, which are studies using the "would have known" methodology in unfamiliar con-
texts, the bias can cause as much as 27 percent of a population to change its mind in a di-
chotomous decision. Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 48 Org Beh & Human Decision
Processes at 161 (cited in note 2). Factors that are relevant to a determination of liability,
but that were not incorporated into this estimate, can increase the size of the effect even
further. For example, negative events, which would be more typical subjects of a legal dis-
pute than positive ones, result in a larger bias, see Brown, Williams, and Lees-Haley, 24 J
Applied Soc Psych at 665-72 (cited in note 25); Haslam and Jayasinghe, 8 J Beh Decision
Making at 129-36 (cited in note 26); Lipshitz and Barak, 88 Acta Psychologica at 110-15,
122 (cited in note 29); Mitchell and Kalb, 66 J Applied Psych at 605-09 (cited in note 29);
David A. Schkade and Lynda M. Kilbourne, Expectation-Outcome Consistency and Hind-
sight Bias, 49 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes 105, 111-19 (1991); Walster, 20 Hu-
man Rel at 240-48 (cited in note 14). More complex material can also increase the size of
the effect. See Nario and Branscombe, 21 Personality & Soc Psych Bull at 1248-52 (cited
in note 26); Pennington, 20 Brit J Soc Pysch at 93-95 (cited in note 24); Roese and Olson,
32 J Exp Soc Psych at 205-18 (cited in note 26).
"See Jonathan Baron and John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54
J Personality & Soc Psych 569, 570 (1988) (describing and documenting the outcome bias).
"Many studies have found such a tendency. See, for example, Carli and Leonard, 8 J
Soc & Clinical Psych at 338 (cited in note 26) (People blamed a rape victim for failing to
have avoided a situation that made her vulnerable to attack--even though people in fore-
sight stated that the same situation seemed benign.); Goggin and Range, 3 J Soc & Clini-
cal Psych at 234-35 (cited in note 26) (People blame the family members of a suicide victim
for failing to have predicted the tragedy.); Lipshitz and Barak, 88 Acta Psychologica at
110-15 (cited in note 29) (The consequences of a threatened terrorist attack heavily influ-
enced Israeli Defense Force officer's evaluations of a military commander's response to the
threat.). A series of studies have demonstrated the influence of the outcome and the hind-
sight biases on evaluations of accountants' decisions. Anderson, Lowe, and Reckers, 14 J
Econ Psych at 725-27 (cited in note 29); D. Jordan Lowe and Philip M.J. Reckers, The Ef-
fects of Hindsight Bias on Jurors' Evaluations of Auditor Decisions, 25 Decision Sci 401,
413-14 (1994); Jennings, Lowe, and Reckers (unpublished manuscript) (cited in note 30).
' See Dan Zakay, The Evaluation of Managerial Decisions' Quality by Managers, 56
Acta Psychologica 49, 52 (1984) (Professional managers consider a decision's outcome to be
the most important factor in evaluating the quality of a decision.).
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B. Causes of the Hindsight Bias
Why is a known outcome so difficult to ignore? Psychologists
have proposed three principal theories to explain the hindsight
bias. Two theories are motivational, meaning that they attribute
the bias to people's needs or desires, and the third theory is cog-
nitive, meaning that it attributes the bias to the mental strate-
gies that people rely upon when making judgments in hindsight.
First, people want to see the world as stable and predictable, and
the hindsight bias is simply part of more global coping mecha-
nisms. Second, most people want others to think of them as intel-
ligent and perceptive, and so they exaggerate their ability to pre-
dict outcomes. Finally, the cognitive theory proposes that learn-
ing an outcome alters what people believe about the world in
ways that make the known outcome seem inevitable. Other ex-
planations have been proposed as well, but they have been re-
jected,8 leaving these three theories as the principal explanations
for the bias. Of the three, the cognitive theory provides the best
account of the hindsight bias, although motivational factors
probably also influence judgments made in hindsight.
1. Theory one: the just world theory.
"One undoubtedly feels more secure if the world seems like
an orderly and predictable place." 9 This desire manifests itself in
a belief called the "just world theory.' ° Individuals who subscribe
to the just world theory believe that "people usually get what
they deserve."4' People differ in their tendency to believe in a just
world, but most subscribe to this belief to some degree. The hind-
'One early explanation for the bias was that the past seems more certain and hence
more predictable than the future, but Fischhoff tested and rejected this hypothesis. See
Baruch Fischhoff, The Effect of Temporal Setting on Likelihood Estimates, 15 Org Beh &
Human Decision Processes 180, 192-93 (1976). See also Deborah J. Mitchell, J. Edward
Russo, and Nancy Pennington, Back to the Future: Temporal Perspective in the Explana-
tion of Events, 2 J Beh Decision Making 25, 35 (1989) (discussing, testing, and rejecting
this hypothesis). Another possible cause of the bias is that people anchor their estimates of
what they would have known around certainty (100 percent probability) and adjust
downward-insufficiently. Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 298 (cited in note 2). This hypothe-
sis, however, fails to account for findings that indicate that the known outcome influences
subjects' interpretation of the antecedent events. See Hawkins and Hastie, 107 Psych Bull
at 321 (cited in note 2). The anchoring hypothesis also predicts that the size of the effect
would not vary depending upon whether the subject was told an event did or did not occur,
in fact, the effect is larger for occurrences than nonoccurrences. Id.
Walster, 20 Human Rel at 239 (cited in note 14).
"See generally Melvin J. Lerner and Dale T. Miller, Just World Research and the At-
tribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 Psych Bull 1030 (1978) (discussing the just
world theory).
41 Id at 1030.
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sight bias seems closely related to the belief in a just world. If a
tragedy was foreseeable, then logically, its victims can be blamed
for failing to avoid it.42 Attributing the hindsight bias to the need
to believe in a just world would also explain why the bias seems
especially pronounced for adverse events,43 because people pre-
sumably have a greater need to control adversity than good for-
tune." Even though some research shows that there is a positive
correlation between the hindsight bias and the belief in a just
world, this correlation is weak.45 The need to see the world as
stable and orderly fails to completely account for the hindsight
bias.
2. Theory two: impression management.
Subjects in psychology experiments, as in most social set-
tings, try to avoid looking foolish-a phenomenon known as "im-
pression management."' Consequently, subjects in the hindsight
studies might be asserting that they could have predicted out-
comes even if others could not as part of an effort to show the ex-
perimenter (or other subjects or themselves) that they are intelli-
gent. Several findings, however, are inconsistent with the im-
pression management theory. Even when subjects know that
their responses are anonymous, they still exhibit a hindsight
bias.47 Also, there is no correlation between the importance of the
materials to the subjects and the magnitude of the bias." Pre-
See Walster, 20 Human Rel at 239 (cited in note 14).
See Brown, Williams, and Lees-Haley, 24 J Applied Soc Psych at 665-72 (cited in
note 25); Haslam and Jayasinghe, 8 J Beh Decision Making at 129-34 (cited in note 26);
Lipshitz and Barak, 88 Acta Psychologica at 108, 117-23 (cited in note 29); Mitchell and
Kalb, 66 J Applied Psych at 605-09 (cited in note 29); Schkade and Kilbourne, 49 Org Beh
& Human Decision Processes at 111-19 (cited in note 34); Walster, 20 Human Rel at 240-
48 (cited in note 14).
"See Walster, 20 Human Rel at 239 (cited in note 14).
See Jennifer D. Campbell and Abraham Tesser, Motivational interpretations of
hindsight bias: An individual difference analysis, 51 J Personality 605, 613-15 (1983)
(finding a marginal correlation between hindsight bias and "just deserts"); Carli and
Leonard, 8 J Soc & Clinical Psych at 335 (cited in note 26) (finding no appreciable rela-
tionship between the bias and the "just world theory"); Walster, 20 Human Rel at 249
(cited in note 14). If the data from Verplanken and Pieters, 1 J Beh Decision Making at
141 (cited in note 31), should be reinterpreted as previously described, then this study also
obtained similar results.
"See generally Barry R. Schlenker, Impression Management: The Self-Concept, Social
Identity, and Interpersonal Relations (Brooks/Cole 1980) (discussing the elaborate litera-
ture on impression management).
"Connolly and Bukszar, 3 J Beh Decision Making at 208 (cited in note 25).
"Campbell and Tesser, 51 J Personality at 612-15; Leary, 115 J Soc Psych at 28 (cited
in note 24); Leary, 8 Personality & Soc Psych Bull at 260-61 (cited in note 24); Synodinos,
16 J Applied Soc Psych at 110-14 (cited in note 24). Only Mark and Mellor, 76 J Applied
Psych at 569-75 (cited in note 26), found any relationship between the size of the bias and
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sumably, the more significant that the materials are to one's self-
esteem, the more critical it would be to have accurately predicted
the outcome. Furthermore, increasing subjects' motivation to
make accurate estimates reduces, but does not eliminate, the
hindsight bias.49 Finally, in studies in which subjects had to recall
the estimates that they provided before they knew the outcome-
even though the subjects were aware that the experimenter had
recorded their original estimates and that reporting biased rec-
ollections would only make them look foolish-they still exhibited
a hindsight bias." Although impression management affects the
size of the hindsight bias, like the belief in a just world, it does
not explain all of the data. Overall, "motivational factors do not
appear to play a large role" in explaining the hindsight bias.5
3. Theory three: cognitive explanations.
Motivational explanations thus being inadequate, the hind-
sight bias must be the product of the thought process that people
use to make judgments in hindsight. Fischhoff's phrase, "creep-
ing determinism," itself describes the cognitive theory that best
explains the hindsight bias. According to this theory, people
naturally integrate an outcome and the events that preceded it
into a coherent story.53 In so doing, they attribute the outcome to
some of the precipitating circumstances, making these circum-
stances seem more significant than they appeared in foresight.'
People also downplay the importance of other antecedents that
would have been likely to lead to alternative outcomes.55 For ex-
the importance of the material to the subjects.
See Elizabeth Creyer and William T. Ross, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Interference in
Choice: The Mediating Effect of Cognitive Effort, 55 Org Beh and Human Decision Proc-
esses 61, 71-73 (1993) (finding that hindsight bias was reduced when accuracy of predic-
tion was important); Davies, 27 J Res Personality at 225-32 (cited in note 25)
("[IInstructions to work harder or to avoid hindsight bias have no impact on the magni-
tude of the hindsight bias."); Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J Exp
Psych: Human Perception & Performance 349, 354-56 (1977) (finding that hindsight bias
is unaffected by warnings about its effect); Hell, et al, 16 Memory & Cognition at 537
(cited in note 27) (finding that incentive for correct recall did not reduce hindsight bias);
Sharpe and Adair, 56 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes at 238-42 (cited in note 27)
(instructing students not to produce biased assessments had no impact on the hindsight
bias).
See Hawkins and Hastie, 107 Psych Bull at 312-14 (cited in note 2).
Id at 317.
Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 288 (cited in note 2). See Hawkins and Hastie, 107
Psych Bull at 322 (cited in note 2), for a full description and elaboration of this theory.
See Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 297 (cited in note 2); Hawkins and Hastie, 107
Psych Bull at 322 (cited in note 2) (arguing that the process is not automatic).
See Hawkins and Hastie, 107 Psych Bull at 321-22 (cited in note 2).
, See id. Ignoring inconsistent information is a common problem in judgment tasks.
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ample, in Fischhoff's original study using the British-Gurkha
conflict, subjects told that the British had won rated the British
advantages (better weapons and training) as more relevant to the
outcome than the Nepalese advantages (better motivation and
familiarity with the terrain)." These subjects probably also con-
cluded that training and weapons are more important to a mili-
tary victory under these circumstances than motivation and fa-
miliarity with the terrain, and perhaps are more significant in
warfare generally.57 These subjects naturally relied upon these in-
ferences to judge the likely outcome of the conflict. Even if people
can suppress specific knowledge of the outcome, they are unable
to forget the insights inferred from that outcome."8 Consequently,
the actual outcome seems more likely after it is known than be-
forehand.
The creeping determinism theory has other support in the
literature. Materials that directly attribute the outcome to an oc-
currence unrelated to any of the antecedents do not produce a
hindsight bias.59 For example, subjects reading the British-
Gurkha conflict who were told that the Nepalese won due to a
freak snow storm did not rate a Nepalese victory as more likely
than subjects who were not told the outcome of the conflict."
Creeping determinism also explains why adding more informa-
tion increases the size of the bias;6 the more antecedent facts
that can be integrated into an explanation for the outcome, the
more inevitable it will seem. This theory also accounts for the
finding that materials describing the occurrence of an event pro-
See Asher Koriat, Sarah Lichtenstein, and Baruch Fischhoff, Reasons for Confidence, 6 J
Exp Psych: Human Learning & Memory 107, 108 (1980) (finding that subjects remain con-
fident in their decisions despite being confronted with conflicting information).
" Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 291-92, 295-97 (cited in note 2). This result has been
replicated in other contexts. See Anderson, Lowe, and Reckers, 14 J Econ Psych at 727-30
(cited in note 29) (Subjects who learned that a company subsequently went bankrupt
rated "accounting red flags" as more important than subjects told that the company did
well.); Lowe and Reckers, 25 Decision Sci at 413 (cited in note 36) (Subjects told that an
investment went badly rated negative signs as more important and positive signs as less
important than subjects told that the investment went well.).
See Hawkins and Hastie, 107 Psych Bull at 322 (cited in note 2).
See generally Marcia K. Johnson, Shahin Hashtroudi, and D. Stephen Lindsay,
Source Monitoring, 114 Psych Bull 3 (1993) (discussing the difficulty of remembering
when and how something was learned).
' See Wasserman, Lempert, and Hastie, 17 Personality & Soc Psych Bull at 34 (cited
in note 24).
' Id. See also Brown and Solomon, 62 Acct Rev at 568-75 (cited in note 25) (finding
less bias when bad outcome of a business was said to have been caused by an unexpected
change in copyright law).
" See Nario and Branscombe, 21 Personality & Soc Psych Bull at 1252 (cited in note
26); Pennington, 20 Brit J Soc Psych at 93-95 (cited in note 24); Roese and Olson, 32 J Exp
Soc Psych at 205-18 (cited in note 26).
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duce a larger hindsight bias than materials stating that an event
did not occur;6" occurrences are generally easier to explain than
nonoccurrences. More so than any of the motivational theories,
Fischhoff's original hypothesis seems to account for the pattern
of data in the literature on the hindsight bias.
Other cognitive factors also may be at work. Some research-
ers have attributed at least part of the hindsight bias to selective
memory for those antecedent events that would make the known
outcome seem more likely.' Although Fischhoff found no evidence
to support this hypothesis,' the results of one other study did
support it. 5 Selective memory and attention to various antece-
dent events may also be a cognitive cause of the hindsight bias,
but this has yet to be sufficiently tested.
C. Debiasing
Fischhoff's demonstration of the hindsight bias was followed
by a series of efforts to find a successful debiasing strategy-a
way of evaluating the predictability of past events accurately.
These efforts have been unsuccessful. Because motivational fac-
tors only partly account for the bias, attempts to increase people's
incentives to make accurate judgments, such as paying subjects
for correct estimates 6 or urging them to "try harder,"7 reduce the
bias only slightly. The bias is primarily a product of cognitive
processes, and only procedures that alter the mental strategies
used to make judgments in hindsight have any chance of pro-
ducing unbiased evaluations.
Psychologists have tried a number of different cognitive
strategies to avoid the hindsight bias. Simple remedies, such as
informing people about the bias' and giving subjects repeated at-
tempts to make judgments with feedback, 9 have no effect. Sev-
eral studies have reliably reduced the bias by restructuring the
decisionmaking task so as to force people to "unlearn" what the
outcome has taught them about the antecedent events. Slovic and
See Christensen-Szalanski and Willham, 48 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes
at 155 (cited in note 2).
See Hawkins and Hastie, 107 Psych Bull at 320-21 (cited in note 2).
Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 291-92, 295-97 (cited in note 2).
"See Lynn Hasher, Mary S. Attig, and Joseph W. Alba, I Knew It All Along: Or, Did
I?, 20 J Verbal Learning & Verbal Beh 86, 88-94 (1981).
See Hell, et al, 16 Memory & Cognition at 535 (cited in note 27).
See Davies, 40 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes at 51-65 (cited in note 25);
Fischhoff, 3 J Exp Psych at 354-56 (cited in note 49).
See Fischhoff, 3 J Exp Psych at 354-56 (cited in note 49).
See Pohl and Hell, 67 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes at 51-55 (cited in note
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Fischhoff asked subjects to determine whether they would be able
to explain the alternative outcome if it had occurred.70 Fischhoff
and his colleagues had subjects draw out a "fault tree" for all pos-
sible outcomes before assigning probabilities to these outcomes."'
Davies had subjects, in foresight, make notes on their efforts to
generate the likelihood of the various outcomes and then had the
subjects review these notes before trying to recall these likelihood
estimates in hindsight.72 In one study, researchers had subjects
generate their own descriptions of the possible outcomes.7" Fi-
nally, several researchers have tried asking subjects to provide
reasons for their probability assessments. 4 All of these methods
forced the subjects to rethink the inferences that they made upon
learning the outcome and demonstrated to them that other infer-
ences remained plausible. Nevertheless, the subjects, judging in
hindsight, still knew that there was but a single reality. Inevita-
bly, they assigned more weight to that reality and the inferences
that it inspired. As a result, these techniques reduced the size of
the hindsight bias but did not produce completely unbiased
judgments. 5 Complete elimination of the bias has eluded psy-
chologists.
Thus, the psychological research demonstrates that the hind-
sight bias is an extremely robust phenomenon. It influences
judgments made in many different settings by many different
types of people. The bias is also large enough to have an impor-
tant impact on the legal system and has been shown to affect the
two kinds of decisionnakers upon which the legal system relies-
groups (juries)76 and experienced decisionmakers (judges).77 The
Slovic and Fischhoff, 3 J Exp Psych at 548-49 (cited in note 25).
A "fault tree" consists of a diagram of all of the possible outcomes and the possible
consequences of these outcomes and an assignment of a probability to each "branch."
Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic, and Sarah Lichtenstein, Fault Trees: Sensitivity of Esti-
mated Failure Probabilities to Problem Representation, 4 J Exp Psych: Human Perception
& Performance 330,331 (1978).
Davies, 40 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes at 51-64 (cited in note 25).
Lowe and Reckers, 25 Decision Sci at 412-15 (cited in note 36) (asking subjects to
provide alternative outcomes to the outcome given them).
" See Arkes, et al, 73 J Applied Psych at 306-07 (cited in note 29); Davies, 27 J Res
Personality at 229-33 (cited in note 25); Hell, et al, 16 Memory & Cognition at 535-36
(cited in note 27).
" The most effective debiasing study only reduced the bias to slightly more than one-
half of the difference between the ordinary hindsight and the foresight judgments. Lowe
and Reckers, 25 Decision Sci at 414 (cited in note 36).
', The results of the research on groups is particularly significant for the extension of
the hindsight bias to legal judgments. It might well be the case that group decisionmaking
forces individuals to discuss their reasoning in a way that facilitates debiasing. Alterna-
tively, research shows that groups seem to polarize toward more extreme positions than
individuals. See Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition 200-48 (Free Press
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bias is a product of the normal process of integrating feedback
into our understanding of the world and updating our beliefs. As
such, it resists efforts to avoid it. No matter how a judgment
made in hindsight is restructured, the feeling that an outcome
was both inevitable and predictable is impossible to avoid. Be-
cause courts primarily judge in hindsight, the bias might exert
tremendous influence on judgments in the legal system.
II. THE HINDSIGHT BIAS IN LEGAL DECISIONS
A. Studies of the Hindsight Bias and Legal Culpability
The research on the hindsight bias shows that people blame
others for failing to have predicted adverse outcomes that could
not have been predicted. 8 Two studies, one by Susan and Gary
LaBine"9 and another by Kim Kamin and me,80 demonstrate ex-
plicitly that the bias even causes people to hold decisionmakers
legally liable for outcomes that they could not have predicted. In
1986) (providing a full discussion of the phenomenon). This might exacerbate the effect of
the hindsight bias. The data, however, support neither theory. Groups seem to show
slightly less bias than individuals, but are still affected by the bias. Bukszar and Connolly,
31 Acad Mgmt J at 631 (cited in note 25) (groups of three to five subjects); Stahlberg, et al,
63 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes at 51-55 (cited in note 25) (groups of three to five
subjects).
Anderson, Lowe, and Reckers, 14 J Econ Psych at 730 (cited in note 29) (auditors
and judges); Jennings, Lowe, and Reckers (unpublished manuscript) (cited in note 30) (ex-
amining judges' dependence on outcome knowledge).
See Carl and Leonard, 8 J Soc & Clinical Psych at 338 (cited in note 26) (Rape vic-
tim blamed for failing to foresee attack.); Goggin and Range, 3 J Soc & Clinical Psych at
234-35 (cited in note 26) (Family members of a suicide victim blamed for failing to have
predicted the tragedy.); Lipshitz and Barak, 88 Acta Psychologica at 110-15 (cited in note
29) (Consequences of a threatened terrorist attack heavily influenced Israeli Defense
Force officer's evaluations of a military commander's response to the threat.). Similarly, a
series of studies have shown that people blame accountants for failing to predict adverse
business outcomes even when accountants in foresight could not have predicted these out-
comes. See Anderson, Lowe, and Reckers, 14 J Econ Psych at 725-27 (cited in note 29);
Jennings, Lowe, and Reckers (unpublished manuscript) (cited in note 30); Lowe and Reck-
ers, 25 Decision Sci at 413-14 (cited in note 36). The hindsight bias even influences
evaluations of decisions made within the legal system. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Sec-
ond-Guessing the Jury: Stereotypic and Hindsight Biases in Perceptions of Court Cases, 20
J Applied Soc Psych 1112, 1116 (1990) (finding that when subsequent information reveals
that a verdict is inaccurate, people evaluate the quality of a jury deliberation as poor);
Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict, and Jo L. Perry, Juror Decision Making, Atti-
tudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 L & Human Beh 291, 298-301 (1989) (Mock jurors' ver-
dicts in a suit against police officers for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation depended
upon whether the search revealed incriminating evidence or not.); Dorothy K. Kagehiro, et
al, Hindsight Bias and Third-Party Consenters to Warrantless Police Searches, 15 L &
Human Beh 305, 309-11 (1991) (Subjects' assessments of roommate's right to consent to a
police search of residence is dependent on whether incriminating evidence is found.).
' Susan J. LaBine and Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight
Bias, 20 L & Human Beh 501 (1996).
8' Kamin and Rachlinski, 19 L & Human Beh 89 (cited in note 4).
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their study, the LaBines presented subjects with six case histo-
ries of mentally ill patients, each of which suggested some prob-
ability of violent behavior. In each case, a psychotherapist treat-
ing the patient took a precaution against violence (for example,
alerting police or warning potential victims) that had been en-
dorsed by a majority of professional psychotherapists in a previ-
ous survey. The patient either did or did not commit violence.
Subjects who read that the patient later committed a violent act
were more likely to conclude that: the therapist had failed to take
reasonable precautions; the therapist should have done more to
prevent possible violence; they themselves would have been able
to predict the violence (even though the subjects were not mental
health professionals); and the violent act was foreseeable."s Most
importantly, nearly one in four of these subjects concluded that
the therapist was legally negligent for failing to prevent the vio-
lence. Because of the scenario's outcome, one-quarter of the sub-
jects judged therapists who had followed a widely approved stan-
dard of treatment as negligent. 2
In the study that Kamin and I conducted, subjects were ran-
domly assigned either to make a decision in foresight as to
whether a municipality should take a precaution against flooding
or to judge in hindsight whether a decision not to take the same
precaution was negligent."e In foresight, the subjects listened to
an audio-taped debate of a municipal planning meeting that de-
scribed the circumstances of the decision. The materials in-
structed subjects that they were to listen to the evidence and to
decide whether the precaution should be taken based on a cost-
benefit analysis akin to Judge Learned Hand's formula for negli-
gence.' The subjects were provided with the costs of the flood and
the precaution ($1,000,000 and $100,000, respectively), as well as
meteorological and anecdotal data. The subjects were then asked
to estimate the annual probability of a flood without the precau-
tion."5 The materials instructed the subjects that, if they found
"I LaBine and LaBine, 20 L & Human Beh at 507-09 (cited in note 79).
Id at 510. LaBine and LaBine did not inform their subjects that the precautions
taken by the therapist were approved by a consensus of mental health professionals,
which might have helped the therapists in such cases defend themselves against liability.
See W. Page Keeton, et al, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 32 at 189 (West 5th ed
1984) ("Prosser on Torts").
"Kamin and Rachlinski, 19 L & Human Beh at 93-94 (cited in note 4).
"[1f the probability [of injury] be called P; the injury, L; the burden [of precautions],
B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: ie., whether B < PL."
United States v Carroll Towing Co, 159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947) (opinion by Hand).
The materials stated that the precaution would completely eliminate the probability
of a flood. Kamin and Rachlinski, 19 L & Human Beh at 95 (cited in note 4).
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that the probability of a flood was greater than 10 percent, they
should decide in favor of taking the precaution; otherwise, they
should decide against taking it.
The hindsight materials provided similar information, except
that they described a jury trial, rather than a planning meeting,
and all of the events had already occurred. The materials stated
that the defendant had decided not to take the precautions, which
had then resulted in $1 million in flood damage to the property of
the plaintiff, an upstream landowner. The instructions stated
that if, given the information available to the defendant before
the flood, the likelihood of a flood each year was greater than 10
percent, then they should find the defendant liable; otherwise,
the subjects should find the defendant not liable. The hindsight
condition was identical to the foresight condition in almost all
other respects. The two conditions produced markedly different
results, however. In foresight only 24 percent of the subjects de-
cided that the potential for harm merited taking the precaution;
in hindsight, however, 57 percent of the subjects found a decision
not to take the precaution negligent.86 Just as in the LaBines'
study, in hindsight people deemed as negligent a response that
they would have endorsed in foresight.
B. What Types of Judgments Does the Hindsight Bias Affect?
Courts' ex post judgments of ex ante decisions fall into three
categories: (1) judgments under objective ("should have known")
standards; (2) judgments under subjective ("did know") stan-
dards; and (3) judgments of what was foreseeable. The hindsight
bias probably influences all three of these, albeit in slightly dif-
ferent ways. Courts also make many judgments in hindsight that
do not require an evaluation of ex ante decisions and are there-
fore not subject to the influence of the hindsight bias.87
Id at 98.
For example, according to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a tort defendant is the
legal cause of all harm that flows from his or her negligent conduct unless "after the event
and looking back from the harm to the negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly ex-
traordinary that it should have brought about the harm." (emphasis added). Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 435(2) (1965). A comment to this section makes it even more clear that
the rule intentionally relies on outcome knowledge:
While the actor may be responsible for the situation, it is not necessarily a situation
which he, as a reasonable man, should have expected to result from his conduct. The
court, however, knows that it has resulted and in such a manner as to make the actor
responsible for its creation. Knowing this, the court may well not be surprised nor re-
gard it as highly extraordinary that the stimulus of the situation should produce the
intervening act; indeed, to one knowing the situation, the intervention of the act
might well appear certain or almost inevitable.
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1. Objective standards.
Of these three types of judgments, research on the hindsight
bias most directly implicates objective standards. When a court
must determine what someone "knew or should have known," it is
especially likely to fall prey to the hindsight bias. Consider the
assessment of negligence in a tort action as an example. A defen-
dant's conduct was negligent if it created an "unreasonable risk of
harm" to others, "which the actor should recognize at the time of
his action or inaction." 9 The determination of whether a defen-
dant's conduct was unreasonable is necessarily made after the
consequences of an actor's conduct are known, but this knowledge
is not supposed to influence the determination of reasonableness.
As Prosser and Keeton explain:
The actor's conduct must be judged in the light of the possi-
bilities apparent to him at the time, and not by looking
backward 'with wisdom born of the event.' The standard is
one of conduct, rather than of consequences. It is not enough
that everyone can see now that the risk [of harm] was great,
if it was not apparent when the conduct occurred.'
Unfortunately, people always judge conduct on its consequences."'
The legal formulation of negligence requires a trier of fact to do
something that people cannot do-see the world through the eyes
of the defendant before the adverse outcome occurred. Judgments
made under objective standards, such as a determination of neg-
ligence in tort, invite the hindsight bias's influence.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(2) comment d. By affirmatively asserting that the as-
sessment of causation should be made in light of all available information, the Restate-
ment deliberately requests a determination that is influenced by the known outcome, even
though this standard ensures that defendants will be responsible for all but the most out-
landish consequences. See Keeton, et al, Prosser on Torts § 43 at 298-99 (cited in note 82)
("[T]o one gifted with omniscience as to all existing circumstances, no result could appear
remarkable, or indeed anything but inevitable, as a matter of hindsight."). Although some
have argued that rules that incorporate ex ante knowledge have adverse economic conse-
quences, see Omri Ben-Shahar, Should Products Liability Be Based on Past or Present
Scientific Knowledge? (Apr 1997) (on file with U Chi L Rev), many legal rules retain this
feature.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282.
Id at § 282 comment g.
Keeton, et al, Prosser on Torts § 31 at 170 & n 15 (cited in note 82), quoting Green v
Sibley, Lindsay & Curr, Co, 257 NY 190, 192, 177 NE 416, 417 (1931) (opinion by Car-
dozo).
" See Baron and Hershey, 54 J Personality & Soc Psych at 578 (cited in note 35).
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2. Subjective standards.
The hindsight bias also might influence subjective evalua-
tions. Judges and juries might infer that because something was
predictable, it was, in fact, actually predicted. Consider the ex-
ample of liability for fraud under the federal securities laws.92 A
company that fails to meet its quarterly earnings projection
might find that its stock price drops when this news is an-
nounced, and the managers of such a company might be sued.9"
The bias might make it easier for the plaintiff to prove that the
defendants knew the earnings projection was overly optimistic.
This is true even if the defendants did not, in fact, know the pro-
jection was overly optimistic.
Empirical data documenting this tendency are lacking, how-
ever. Although the hindsight bias induces people to blame others
for misfortune, it is not clear whether this occurs because people
assume that the victims of misfortune actually "knew" that they
were facing potential adversity and failed to avoid it, or merely
"should have known" that they were facing potential adversity.
Fischhoff did demonstrate that the hindsight bias influences peo-
ple's estimates of the beliefs that others hold about likely out-
comes, 4 but no one has empirically linked this phenomenon to
mistaken attributions of intentional misconduct. Research on the
hindsight bias strongly suggests that people will impute knowl-
edge to others, but conclusive evidence is as yet unavailable.
Even if subjective standards invite biased judgments, the hind-
sight bias probably has less influence on judgments made under
subjective standards than it does on judgments made under ob-
jective standards. In a case judged under a subjective standard,
evidence of a defendant's actual state of mind may be available in
the form of notes or comments, that the defendant made at the
time the event occurred. The bias may color a factfinder's view of
this evidence, but probably not as easily as it colors a judgment
as to what a defendant should have known.95
See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38
Ariz L Rev 639, 644-46 (1996) (discussing the implications of the hindsight bias to the as-
sessment of scienter in securities fraud cases).
"See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Secu-
rities Class Actions, 43 Stan L Rev 497, 508-09 (1991) (discussing massive derivative class
action suits that follow drastic falls in a stock's price).
Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 295-97 (cited in note 2).
Although a discussion of the application of the hindsight bias to criminal law is be-
yond the scope of this Article, if the bias does affect subjective judgments, then it is likely
to have an impact on the outcome of criminal cases.
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3. Foreseeability.
Finally, many areas of law require courts to determine what
was "foreseeable." As distinguished from the objective standard of
liability, foreseeability is qualitative. It refers to a range of possi-
ble occurrences rather than to the likelihood that any of these oc-
currences will come to pass. For example, in products liability, a
manufacturer can be liable for injuries to a plaintiff who engaged
in "foreseeable misuse" of a product."
More generally in tort, a defendant is only liable for damages
to foreseeable plaintiffs."s Intuitively, it seems likely that once the
outcome is known, the hindsight bias will make the outcome ap-
pear more foreseeable. Even more so than the subjective hind-
sight problems, however, this theory lacks data. Studies on the
hindsight bias have documented its influence on probability esti-
mates, not on what could have been envisioned. No one has con-
ducted a careful study of exactly what makes an outcome seem
"foreseeable" as opposed to "predictable.9
4. Summary.
The remainder of this Article is devoted largely to the prob-
lem of the hindsight bias's influence on objective standards
within the law. Here the analysis is reasonably clear. In the case
of objective judgments, the legal system asks judges and juries to
make determinations that closely resemble the questions that
psychologists have used in their materials. Good faith assess-
ments of what constitutes a reasonable course of action in fore-
sight can easily be judged unreasonable in hindsight. Although
the hindsight bias also might affect judgments of subjective
knowledge or foreseeability, these theories lack empirical sup-
port. Because it seems likely that the bias does affect these two
" See Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging
Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 Mercer L Rev 403, 420-26 (1978). This doctrine has
evolved, and the draft Restatement of Products Liability proposes that a comparative fault
scheme be used to judge liability as between the manufacturer of a product and a plaintiff
who misuses the product. See Restatement of the Law (Third) Torts: Products Liability
§ 11 comment b (Tentative Draft no 3 1996).
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 comment c. This assertion can be traced
originally to Justice Cardozo's majority opinion in Palsgraf v Long Island R Co, 248 NY
339, 162 NE 99 (1928).
" LaBine and LaBine, 20 L & Human Beh at 509 (cited in note 79), did report that
subjects described the actual outcome of their scenarios as more foreseeable than ones
that did not occur. Their data, however, does not track the legal limitation on foreseeabil-
ity-that is, whether the plaintiff was a foreseeable plaintiff and the harm done was a
foreseeable type of harm. See Keeton, et al, Prosser on Torts § 43 at 297-300 (cited in note
82).
1998] 593
The University of Chicago Law Review
types of judgments, however, this Article also includes an appli-
cation of the bias to an issue judged under a subjective standard
(in federal securities law) and to an issue of foreseeability (in pat-
ent law).
C. Countervailing Influences
In some circumstances, the hindsight bias might not have as
significant an impact on the legal system as expected. The influ-
ence of the bias can be blunted by other factors or it can affect
both parties to a lawsuit. For example, in tort cases, although the
bias probably makes it easier for plaintiffs to prevail, tort plain-
tiffs generally face fairly significant hurdles to filing a lawsuit
and building a case.9 In fact, few victims of negligence actually
sue.00 In addition, tort plaintiffs also might face other psychologi-
cal biases in the courtroom that make it difficult for them to pre-
vail.101
Furthermore, the availability of comparative negligence as a
defense might result in a process that is influenced by the bias,
but that nevertheless produces unbiased judgments. If the negli-
gence of both parties is at issue, then the defendant might benefit
See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L & Society Rev 95 (1974).
"In medical malpractice, there are ten injuries for every plaintiff who makes a claim
for compensation. See Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence and
Public Policy 22-25 (Harvard 1985). See also The Report of the Harvard Medical Practice
Study, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient
Compensation in New York 7-1 (Harvard 1990) (analyzing trends in the use of legal re-
course to recover for injuries); Troyen A. Brennan, et al, Incidence of Adverse Events and
Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324
New Eng J Med 370, 371-75 (1991) (finding medical management causes substantial inju-
ries, many of which are the result of substandard care); A. Russell Localio, et al, Relation
between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard
Medical Practice Study III, 325 New Eng J Med 245, 249-50 (1991) (arguing that medical
malpractice litigation infrequently compensates patients). Even in automobile accidents,
only about half of all injured victims of negligence pursue claims. See Alfred F. Conard,
The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 Mich L Rev 279, 285 (1964) (Only 14
percent of persons sustaining losses due to automobile accidents hire attorneys.). See also
Donald Harris, et al, Compensation and Support for Illness and Injury 46 (Clarendon
1984) ("Three-quarters of accident victims never considered the question of damages at all,
and of the quarter who did, only about half actually sought legal advice about claiming.");
Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 Ohio St L J 443, 448-52 (1987)
(discussing the tendency of accident victims not to file claims for their injuries).
"O See Neal Feigenson, Jaihyun Park, and Peter Salovey, Effect of Blameworthiness
and Outcome Severity on Attributions of Responsibility and Damage Awards in Compara-
tive Negligence Cases (forthcoming L & Human Beh) (describing an antiplaintiff bias
among jurors); Valerie P. Hans and William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judgments of Business
Liability in Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L & Society
Rev 85, 108 (1992) (presenting evidence that jurors are skeptical of plaintiffs' motives, not
defendants' motives in mounting a defense).
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from the bias in roughly the same proportion as the plaintiff. A
judge or jury might condemn both litigants in a tort suit for fail-
ing to apprehend the true probability of potential injury-thereby
leading, on balance, to an unbiased assignment of fault. Thus, in
cases judged under a comparative fault rule, the hindsight bias
might not have much impact on judgment or might even favor de-
fendants. In these cases, the judgment might be doubly biased,
resulting in a final determination approximating an accurate ap-
portionment of fault. In a system in which the plaintiffs who are
found negligent may not recover (contributory negligence)," 2 the
bias may put the plaintiff at a comparative disadvantage to the
defendant.0 3 These effects are speculative, because no research is
available on whether the hindsight bias has more effect in judg-
ments of the plaintiffs' or defendants' actions.'"
Il. THE CONSEQUENCES OF BIASED JUDGMENTS IN HINDSIGHT
Although direct evidence of the hindsight bias in actual cases
is unavailable, nothing about the transition from the laboratory
to the courtroom suggests that judgments in actual cases are free
from the influence of the hindsight bias.0 5 The bias is large
enough to be of concern to the legal system. Furthermore, there is
no evidence that the use of groups (juries) or experienced deci-
sionmakers (judges) helps avert the bias. Even in circumstances
in which the bias affects both sides of a lawsuit, it is still a power-
ful force in litigation. Legal judgments made under objective
standards are, therefore, probably tainted by the hindsight bias,
thereby resulting in incorrect judgments of liability.
'" See Keeton, et al, Prosser on Torts § 65 at 461 (cited in note 82).
"'The hindsight bias probably affects modified comparative systems, in which a plain-
tiff who is at least as responsible for his or her injury as the defendant cannot recover, see
Keeton, et al, Prosser on Torts § 76 at 473 (cited in note 82), the same way that it affects
comparative systems--making both parties look more culpable.
" One study found that increasing the severity of the outcome caused mock jurors to
increase the blame they assigned to victims of accidents (plaintiffs) rather than to injurers
(defendants). Feigenson, Park, and Salovey (forthcoming L & Human Beh) (cited in note
101). This suggests that the hindsight bias influences judgments of plaintiffs more so than
defendants.
"'Simulation studies of jury decisionmaking like those by the LaBines and Kamin and
me have been criticized for failing to replicate the detail and gravity of judgments made in
actual cases. See Robert M Bray and Norbert L. Kerr, Methodological Considerations in
the Study of the Psychology of the Courtroom, in Norbert L. Kerr and Robert M. Bray, eds,
The Psychology of the Courtroom 287, 305-08 (Academic 1982). But see Robert J. Mac-
Coun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 Sci 1046, 1046 (1989) (con-
cluding that "mock jurors do not appear to reach decisions by a fundamentally different
process than actual jurors").
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Mistakes are doubtlessly common in the legal system and
probably do not have significant adverse consequences on the sys-
tem as a whole." 6 Systematic errors, however, are more worri-
some. They can prejudice a particular group or class and can un-
dermine the law's ability to induce potential defendants to take
reasonable precautions against injuring others.0 7 The hindsight
bias is a systematic error with the capacity to distort the legal
system in undesirable ways.
A. The Economic Consequences of the Hindsight Bias
Intuitively, treating parties as if they were negligent even
though they took reasonable precautions seems likely to have ad-
verse economic consequences. Holding defendants who were not
negligent liable, however, is nothing more pernicious than a sys-
tem of strict liability. In effect, the hindsight bias converts the
negligence standard into a de facto system of strict liability. Neg-
ligence judgments influenced by the hindsight bias should there-
fore have economic consequences similar to those of a system of
strict liability.
Strict liability does not create incentives for potential defen-
dants to take an excess of precautions.0 8 Under both negligence
and strict liability, potential defendants minimize their costs by
taking all socially efficient precautions. Both systems would ap-
pear to create adequate incentives to take efficient precautions.
There are, however, two caveats. First, the possibility that the de-
fendant or the ultimate trier of fact will make errors in deter-
mining due care might, in a negligence system, cause potential
defendants to undertake an inefficient excess of precautions. De-
fendants experience a sharp benefit from increasing their precau-
tions from just below reasonable care to just above it. Therefore,
if there is any uncertainty about what constitutes reasonable
care, defendants should err in favor of an excess of precautions. 9
Second, because strict liability forces potential defendants to pay
"
6 See Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 Yale L J 799,
814-21 (1983); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 549-52 (cited in note 6). But see
John E. Calfee and Richard Craswell, Some Effect of Uncertainty on Compliance with Le-
gal Standards, 70 Va L Rev 965, 974-89 (1984) (arguing that errors can create adverse
consequences).
" See Calfee and Craswell, 70 Va L Rev at 971-74.
"°See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law
64 (Harvard 1987); A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 40-42
(Little, Brown 2d ed 1989); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 175 (cited in note 6);
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J Legal Stud 1, 2-9 (1980).
"See Calfee and Craswell, 70 Va L Rev at 971-74. But see Grady, 92 Yale L J at 819-
21 (arguing that the negligence system accommodates this uncertainty efficiently).
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for all of the injuries that result from an activity, as opposed to
only those that result from negligence, an activity is more expen-
sive under strict liability than under negligence.11 With the ex-
ception of these two issues, however, classic law and economics
models of liability suggest that a system of strict liability would
closely resemble a system of negligence.
The hindsight bias changes the economic comparison be-
tween negligence and strict liability. A system of negligence
judged with the hindsight bias is similar to, but not the same as,
a system of strict liability; it is essentially a "quasi-strict" liability
rule. The bias causes courts to hold defendants who took reason-
able care liable, much as they would under a strict liability rule.
But, because even a biased assessment of reasonable care can re-
sult in a finding that the defendant was not negligent, the two
systems differ somewhat. Defendants who have taken precau-
tions that are far greater than reasonableness requires (as de-
termined in foresight) probably still will be free from liability, in
spite of the bias. Defendants who have taken precautions that are
barely adequate probably will be found negligent because of the
hindsight bias. The amount that potential defendants will have to
spend beyond the socially efficient level of care to be free from li-
ability depends upon the size of the bias, the costs of the excess
precautions, and the impact of these precautions on the probabil-
ity of an adverse outcome. If the savings that potential defen-
dants realize from taking enough precautions to be immune from
"quasi-strict" liability exceed the costs of these precautions, then
defendants will take this socially excessive level of precautions.
A negligence rule judged in hindsight will not necessarily
produce a socially inefficient result, however. When the costs of
the excess precautions are greater than the savings from being
found not liable, potential defendants will minimize their costs at
the socially efficient level of precautions, even though they will
have to pay for the damages that the plaintiffs suffer."'
"'See Landes and R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 64-73 (cited in
note 108); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 175-80 (cited in note 6); Shavell, 9 J
Legal Stud at 23 (cited in note 108).
. If potential defendants systematically underestimate the likelihood of an accident in
foresight, then they would be taking inefficient levels of precautions, absent the hindsight
bias. In such a scenario, the hindsight bias might undo some of the adverse effects of such
underestimates. The size of the effect of the hindsight bias, however, would not necessar-
ily match the degree to which potential defendants are underestimating the probability of
an accident. The combined effect might result in overdeterrence, as described in the text,
or in underdeterrence. This Article does not address the possibilities of ex ante underesti-
mation, although such an effect is a possibility.
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Figure 1 depicts this by graphing the costs that the liability
system, judged in hindsight, will likely impose on potential de-
fendants. The X axis represents the level of precautions the de-
fendant may take and the Y axis indicates the cost of accidents
and precautions. Defendants who are judged non-negligent pay
only for the cost of the precautions, while defendants who are
judged negligent pay for the cost of the precautions plus the dam-
ages caused to the plaintiffs. Total social costs (the cost of the ac-
cident plus the cost of the precautions) are at their lowest at point
P on the graph. Under the conventional economic analysis, defen-
dants are not negligent if they take a level of care of at least that
marked by point P. They minimize their costs at point P under ei-
ther a negligence or strict liability rule-the only difference being
that under a negligence rule, their costs are Q1 while under a
strict liability regime their costs are Q3.
Figure 1: Cost of Accidents and Precautions
Cost of accidents
4 plus precautions
Q4 Cost of
Q4 precautions
Cost Q2
Q2
4 - Cost of accidents
P H1  H2
Level of Precautions
The hindsight bias increases the level of care at which courts
judge defendants not negligent. Therefore, if the bias moves this
point to H1, defendants who only take the socially efficient level of
care (P) will have to pay for both the cost of the precautions and
the cost of the accident (Q3) just as defendants do in strict liabil-
ity. However, if the defendants take the higher level of care (Hi),
they will be required to pay only for the cost of the precautions
(Q2). Thus, because their overall costs will be less, the defendants
will take the higher level of care (Hi). The private savings that
these defendants realize from taking an excess of precautions
[65:571
Judging in Hindsight
outweigh the private costs of these precautions, leading to incen-
tives for defendants to be inefficient. If the effect of the hindsight
bias is larger than this, however, and courts exonerate only de-
fendants who take a level of care of at least that marked by point
H2, defendants will now minimize their costs at the efficient level
of P. This is because, at H2, defendants pay Q4 in costs for precau-
tions, which exceeds Q3.
Thus, the presence of the hindsight bias in the negligence
system has an indeterminate effect on incentives to take ade-
quate precautions. If the consequences of the bias are so severe as
to make negligence resemble strict liability, it might produce in-
centives to be efficient. Under different conditions, however, it
also might create incentives to take an excess of care. Neither
common law judges nor legislators are likely to have the capacity
to distinguish which of these two situations any class of cases
follows. It would take a wealth of econometric data on the cost of
accidents and precautions, along with a precise quantification of
the hindsight bias and its relationship to these precautions, in
order to determine whether judging negligence in hindsight cre-
ates incentives to take an excess of precautions in any given con-
text. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a court to deter-
mine whether negligence judged in hindsight creates inefficient
incentives." Therefore, retaining a negligence system, despite its
biases in judgment, might be the optimum, albeit imperfect, al-
ternative for courts to pursue.
The hindsight bias might have another unintended economic
effect. As noted above, conventional economic analysis concludes
that strict liability imposes higher costs on potential defendants
than negligence does.' Incorporating the hindsight bias into the
analysis, however, either reduces or eliminates this difference. If
the relationship between accidents, precautions, and the hind-
sight bias induces defendants to take an excess of precautions,
potential defendants will face somewhat higher costs than an
analysis without the hindsight bias predicts. Specifically, they
will have to pay for the excess of precautions needed in order to
avoid liability.
"Even defendants might have difficulty determining whether they should take an ex-
cess of precautions or not under the circumstances that they face. Repeat defendants, such
as insurance companies and manufacturers, probably have adequate data to make this de-
termination, because they will know the relationship between their expenditures on pre-
cautions and the expected costs of liability.
"" See Landes and R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 64-73 (cited in
note 108); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 175-80 (cited in note 6); Shavell, 9 J
Legal Stud at 4-5 (cited in note 108).
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If the relationship between accidents, precautions, and the
hindsight bias induces defendants to take the efficient level of
precautions, however, then both negligence and strict liability
impose the same costs on defendants. Under these circumstances,
regardless of the rule, defendants will take only reasonable care
and incur liability for the costs of the accidents that their activity
causes. If the cost of the excess precautions exceeds the savings in
liability that defendants realize, then the choice between negli-
gence and strict liability has no effect on the social cost of the un-
derlying activity."
A system that produced unbiased judgments would, there-
fore, avoid one of two adverse economic consequences of the hind-
sight bias."5 First, unbiased judgments would avoid the possibil-
ity that the hindsight bias would create incentives to undertake
an excess of precautions. Second, in those circumstances in which
judging negligence in hindsight produces the same incentives as
strict liability, the costs of de facto strict liability might make the
underlying activity undesirably expensive. Regardless of whether
the cost of excess precautions exceeds the savings in liability to
the defendant, judging negligence in hindsight is second best to
an unbiased system.
B. Fairness and the Hindsight Bias
Economics aside, the hindsight bias might simply make
judging liability in hindsight unfair. The bias seems to produce
unjust results; it ensures that potential defendants cannot rely on
the legal standard to avoid liability. Hindsight, in effect, raises
the bar after an accident. Shifting legal standards have long been
identified as inequitable. As a seventeenth century court put it:
"a law which a man cannot obey, nor act according to it, is void
and no law.""6 Subjecting parties to standards that increase after
the fact resembles ex post facto laws. In the criminal context, the
United States Constitution expressly forbids ex post facto laws"'
"'Defendants who, for whatever reason, take an excess of precautions will pay less
under a negligence system than a strict liability system. Such defendants will be spending
much more than they need to, however.
"'Simply adopting a system of strict liability instead of negligence would also avoid
the possibility that negligence judged in hindsight would create incentives to take socially
excessive precautions. This solution might have other adverse consequences, however. See
text accompanying notes 108-10.
"'Thomas v Sorrell, Vaughan 330, 124 Eng Rep 1098, 1102 (KB 1677).
'.. US Const Art I, § 9, ci 3. The Constitution does not prohibit ex post facto civil liabil-
ity unless such liability is punitive in nature. United States Trust Co v New Jersey, 431 US
1, 17 n 13 (1977). Retroactive civil liability violates the Due Process Clause of either the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments if its consequences are "harsh and oppressive." Welch v
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because the "[f]ramers sought to assure that legislative acts give
fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their
meaning until explicitly changed.""8 The bias converts an an-
nounced negligence rule into a strict liability rule in application.
An incongruence "between the rules as announced and their ac-
tual administration" such as this smacks of injustice."9
Liability judged in hindsight, however, is less unjust in prac-
tice than this analysis suggests. No court has access to the kind
of information that would indicate that its judgment is biased by
hindsight. A demonstration of the hindsight bias requires com-
paring the probability estimates of people who learn that a deci-
sion turned out badly with the estimates of those who do not
know the consequences of that decision. In contrast, judges and
juries know only their own probability estimates, made in hind-
sight. With only half of the picture, a court might be unaware of
the influence that the hindsight bias has on its assessment of a
party's ex ante actions. Although people generally are aware of
the bias, at the same time they believe that they have assessed
the predictability of the events correctly.2 ' Any single case will
appear to have been correctly and fairly adjudicated. In fact, a
correction might seem less fair than an uncorrected, biased
judgment.
Imagine a case in which a defendant has taken slightly more
precautions than reasonable care, as judged in foresight, re-
quires. Suppose that the hindsight bias causes people judging in
hindsight to exaggerate the ex ante probability of the adverse
outcome, and as a result, the jury finds the defendant negligent.
A correction for the hindsight bias would require that this defen-
dant be exonerated, despite the fact that the judge, jury, plaintiff,
and maybe the defendant now believe that the defendant was
negligent. Rather than the biased hindsight judgment seeming
unfair, a judgment corrected for the hindsight bias would seem
unfair, especially if the case involves a severely injured tort
plaintiff.
Furthermore, potential defendants should understand that,
if their actions injure another, a court necessarily will judge them
in hindsight. Potential defendants can either adjust their level of
care to avoid liability by taking a slight excess of precautions, or
they can act as if they will be judged under a standard of strict li-
Henry, 305 US 134, 146-47 (1938).
"SWeaver v Graham, 450 US 24,28-29 (1981).
"Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 39 (Yale rev ed 1969) (identifying this problem
as one of the ways in which the Rule of Law can miscarry).
See Fischhoff, 1 J Exp Psych at 298 (cited in note 2).
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ability. Although the hindsight bias creates an incongruence be-
tween the law as announced and the law as applied, it is neither
an unpredictable nor an unexpected incongruence. Biased as-
sessments in hindsight are well-understood, and it is therefore
not necessarily unfair to subject potential defendants to them.
Nevertheless, an unbiased judgment clearly would be supe-
rior to a biased one. Over time, repeat players might notice the
tendency of biased judgments to raise standards after the fact, as
might judges. This could undermine the perceived fairness of the
system of civil liability. Furthermore, the choice of a negligence
system rather than a strict liability system might reflect a careful
balancing of the liberty interests of the injurers against the secu-
rity interests of the victims21-a balance that the hindsight bias
disrupts. In addition to economic superiority, a stable standard
probably would be more fair, even if correcting for the hindsight
bias would make individual applications seem unfair.
IV. ADAPTATIONS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Long before empirical studies proved its existence, the hind-
sight bias has been part of folk wisdom. Therefore, it seems likely
that the legal system has developed adaptations to the bias's in-
fluence. Avoiding the influence of the hindsight bias altogether,
however, is probably impossible. Because the bias is so deeply in-
grained into the human judgment process, psychologists have
been unable to develop a way to induce people to make unbiased
ex post judgments of ex ante probabilities. Even if courts under-
stand that judging liability in hindsight generates biased results,
they might be powerless to do anything about it. Although gen-
eral procedures that avoid the bias in all cases are unlikely to be
available, in some specific circumstances, the courts have oppor-
tunities to reduce the bias's influence. In most cases, however,
because the bias makes accurate judgments unavailable, the
courts must struggle to develop a second-best method of assigning
liability.
A. General Procedures to Avoid Biased Judgments
Judicial instructions, suppression of evidence, and the stan-
dard of persuasion are the usual "quality control" mechanisms for
judgment in the courtroom. To aid a jury in reaching a rational
decision, the judge structures the trial and provides instructions
" See Jules Coleman and Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 McGill L J 91,
110-12 (1995) (analyzing the interplay between liberty and security in the debate over
negligence and strict liability).
[65:571
Judging in Hindsight
on how to decide the case. Judges also suppress misleading evi-
dence. 2 The standard of persuasion also is set so as to advance
rational functioning of the legal system. None of these methods,
however, can be used to ameliorate the hindsight bias satisfacto-
rily.
Psychologists have uncovered no way to instruct people on
how to evaluate decisions in hindsight in a way that completely
avoids the hindsight bias. Judicial instructions are unlikely to in-
clude a mechanism that would fare any better. The study that
Kamin and I conducted shows how difficult it would be to use ju-
dicial instructions that even partially debias judgments made in
hindsight.' In addition to measuring the influence of hindsight
on judgments of negligence, this study tested a debiasing strategy
using judicial instructions. The materials in this study warned
half of the subjects in the trial that "a fair determination of prob-
ability may be difficult" because "hindsight vision is always
20/20.""2 The materials instructed the subjects to "take a moment
to think of all the ways in which the event in question may have
happened differently or not at all."" This debiasing procedure
had no effect. 2'
Passive debiasing instructions, such as those used by Kamin
and me, are insufficiently intrusive to counteract the hindsight
bias. The effective strategies that psychologists have used to re-
duce the bias all require much more invasive procedures, such as
drafting a fault tree2 or considering and explaining alternative
outcomes. Because they are so intrusive, these procedures may
not be suitable for the courtroom. The debiasing procedures that
psychologists have found to be partly successful surpass the tra-
ditional techniques that courts use to control jury decisionmak-
ing. Furthermore, even if a debiasing technique could be success-
fully shoe-horned into the trial context, it would still only partly
reduce the effect. No strategy has been found for completely
avoiding the bias.
In fact, courts do not attempt to use judicial instructions as a
means of debiasing jurors. Instructions typically ask for unbiased
ex post judgments of ex ante probabilities without suggesting
how to accomplish this complex cognitive task. For example, the
California Bar Association Jury Instructions ("BAJI") simply re-
See, for example, FRE 403.
Kamin and Rachlinski, 19 L & Human Beh at 97-98 (cited in note 4).
"'Idat 97.
'Id.
'Id at 98.
'See note 71.
1998]
The University of Chicago Law Review
quire juries in negligence cases to evaluate whether "a person of
ordinary prudence... in the same situation and possessed of the
same knowledge . . . would have foreseen or anticipated that
someone might have been injured by... his action or inaction." "
The BAJI do not even recommend that a court give so much as a
warning to the jury as to the difficulty of making this assessment,
much less include a debiasing instruction. Other jurisdictions
follow similar patterns.'29 Jury instruction manuals lack general
instructions on how to avoid the hindsight bias, even though they
include instructions that require juries to make judgments that
will almost certainly be biased.30
Another procedure, which is somewhat more invasive than
judicial instructions, is also available to the courts-special ver-
dict forms.' 3 ' Special verdict forms break down the facts needed to
support a cause of action or a defense into separate findings for a
jury. ' 2 Even this procedure is far less invasive than the psycholo-
gists' debiasing strategies, however. Special verdict forms merely
require yes or no responses; they do not demand detailed expla-
nations and do not ask juries explicitly to consider alternative ac-
counts or "fault trees." In fact, courts do not use special verdict
forms as a debiasing technique. Instead, they use them to ensure
that the jury understands the separate elements of the cause of
action and to narrow the issues for a retrial in the event of a suc-
cessful appeal.'33 Modifying special verdict forms to incorporate
debiasing would be a significant departure from past practices.
Such modifications would unduly intrude on the deliberative pro-
cess of the jury and possibly run afoul of the Seventh Amendment
guarantee of the right to a civil jury."M Furthermore, the empiri-
'BAJI § 3.11 (West 7th ed 1986).
'See, for example, 1A New York Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil § 2:10 (Law Co-op
3d ed 1997). But see Edward J. Devitt, Charles B. Blackmar, and Michael A. Wolff, 3 Fed-
eral Jury Practice and Instructions-Civil § 80.07 (West 4th ed 1987) (exhibiting a light
attempt to debias by instructing the jury that "the mere fact that an accident happened...
does not permit the jury to draw the inference that the accident was caused by anyone's
negligence").
'"Instructions are available that implement a substantive restriction that juries re-
frain from inferring negligence based only on the occurrence of an adverse outcome. See
note 129. This issue is discussed in Part IV.B.3.
131FRCP 49(a) authorizes the use of special verdict forms in the federal courts.
"See FRCP 49(a) ("[T]he court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in
the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact.").
"See Charles A. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 94 at 674-76 (West 5th ed
1994); Charles A. Wright, The Use of Special Verdicts in Federal Court, 38 FRD 199, 201-
06 (1966).
'" See Jorgenson v York Ice Machinery Corp, 160 F2d 432, 435 (2d Cir 1947) (express-
ing reluctance to constrain deliberative process of the jury).
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cal evidence on special verdict forms suggests that they have lit-
tle effect on jury decisionmaking.135
Another common legal mechanism for avoiding bias and
prejudice-suppressing evidence-probably cannot cure the hind-
sight bias. To avoid the influence of the bias, the evidence that
needs to be suppressed is the very fact that some adverse event
led to a lawsuit. Courts have used juries to make findings of fact
in the absence of both the injured parties and descriptions of
their injuries.' This kind of bifurcation of a trial does seem to af-
fect jury decisionmaking;3 7 thus, some have advocated using bi-
furcation procedures to eliminate the influence of the hindsight
bias.'38 Even in these bifurcated trials, however, juries cannot
remain completely unaware of the existence of injured plain-
tiffs."'9 In some circumstances, courts do suppress evidence that
would exacerbate the impact of the hindsight bias on judgment;4 °
evidence that would create the conditions for biased judgment,
however, cannot be eliminated from the trial process. Hiding the
extent of injuries will not eliminate the hindsight bias, because
the severity of the outcome does not alter the bias's influence on
assessments of responsibility.' The mere fact of an adverse out-
come creates a biased judgment, and this fact cannot be sup-
pressed from evidence or eliminated from the jury's knowledge by
a special procedure.
Allocating the burden of persuasion against the party likely
to benefit from the hindsight bias could compensate for its influ-
"See Elizabeth C. Wiggins and Steven J. Breckler, Special Verdicts as Guides to Jury
Decision Making, 14 L & Psych Rev 1, 1-2 (1990) (Jurors render their verdicts "on the ba-
sis of overall impressions, rather than on an orderly consideration of the relevant issues.").
"See In re Richardon-Merrell, Inc "Benedectin" Products Liability Litigation, 624 F
Supp 1212, 1222-23 (S D Ohio 1985), affd as Hoffman v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc
(In re Benedectin Litigation), 857 F2d 290 (6th Cir 1988). See also FRCP 42(b) (allowing
bifurcation of issues). For a full discussion of issue separation, see James A. Henderson,
Jr., Fred Bertram, and Michael J. Toke, Optimal Issue Separation in Modern Products Li-
ability Litigation, 73 Tex L Rev 1653, 1675-96 (1995) (outlining which types of issues are
best adjudicated in a bifurcated trial scenario).
See Irwin A. Horowitz and Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of
Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 L & Human Beh 269, 281-85 (1990) (finding
bifurcation of issues resulted in more verdicts for defendant but higher average damage
awards).
'See Arkes and Schipani, 73 Or L Rev at 633-36 (cited in note 8) (advocating this
procedure as a means of reducing the impact of the hindsight bias).
"See David B. Wexler and Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correct for Juror
Hindsight Bias in Mental Health Malpractice Litigation: Some Preliminary Observations,
7 Beh Sci & L 485, 494 (1989) ('The jury will undoubtedly know that they are not being
asked simply to engage in academic exercise.").
"See Part IV.B.4.
.See Walster, 20 Human Rel at 247-48 (cited in note 14). This study did show, how-
ever, that the magnitude of the outcome can influence the size of the bias. Id at 244-47.
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ence. In most civil cases, the plaintiff is, in fact, both the primary
beneficiary of the influence of the hindsight bias and the party
that must carry the burden of persuasion. The most common
standard of persuasion, however, "preponderance of the evi-
dence," is probably too low to compensate for the bias. As applied
to a determination of negligence, for example, the plaintiff must
show that it is more likely than not that the defendant failed to
exercise reasonable care. This requirement makes it slightly more
difficult for the plaintiff to win the case, but the hindsight bias
easily dwarfs the effect that this standard has on the judgment.
The bias gives an average of a 15 percent "boost" to the assessed
probability in foresight'--easily enough to enable the plaintiff to
surmount the 50 percent threshold needed to establish liability in
a close case.'
Raising the standard of persuasion, by requiring "clear and
convincing evidence" for findings that the bias is likely to affect,
might undo its impact on the judgment. Increasing the standard
of persuasion is rare in civil cases, but courts allow it in instances
where "there is thought to be special danger of deception, or
where the court considers that the particular type of claim should
be disfavored on public policy grounds."' This description im-
plies that the standard should be used to eliminate bias, but in-
creasing the standard of persuasion would be an inappropriate
response to the hindsight bias. As a preliminary matter, it is not
entirely clear that the standard of persuasion actually influences
the outcome of cases.'45 Even if raising the standard would make
it more difficult for a party relying on the hindsight bias to win a
case, this reform would treat the symptom and not the disease.
The effect of increasing the standard would be unlikely to match
the effect of the hindsight bias perfectly. It might overcompensate
12 See Part LA.
"See David Kaye, The Laws of Probability and the Law of the Land, 47 U Chi L Rev
34, 47-56 (1979) (defending the proposition that the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard is properly defined as requiring that there be at least a 50 percent chance that the
defendant is liable); David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Stan-
dard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 Am Bar Found
Res J 487, 492-503 (considering the application of probability ratios in joint tortfea-
sor/multiple defendant situations). See also Neil Orloff and Jery Stedinger, A Framework
for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U Pa L Rev 1159 (1983)
(providing a thorough discussion of the preponderance of the evidence standard).
1
"Edward W. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 340 at 961 (West 3d ed 1984).
" See Dorothy K. Kagehiro and W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of
Standards of Proof, 9 L & Human Beh 159, 163-73 (1985) (Empirical study showing that
the different standards of persuasion produced similar jury verdicts.). But see Kevin M.
Clermont, Procedure's Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Deci-
sion, 72 Cornell L Rev 1115, 1148 (1987) (arguing that each commonly used standard of
persuasion has a distinct psychological meaning).
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for the bias. Raising the standard of persuasion to "clear and con-
vincing evidence" might make it too difficult for plaintiffs to win
against defendants who were in fact negligent. 46
For example, imagine a negligence case in which the costs
and benefits of precautions and accidents are such that a defen-
dant should be found liable if the probability of an accident is 20
percent or greater. Suppose that the defendant determines in
foresight (in good faith) that the probability of an accident is only
10 percent. If the hindsight bias makes an ex ante probability es-
timate of 10 percent look like it should have been 25 percent, in
the event of an accident this defendant is likely to be improperly
judged negligent under the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard. Suppose further that raising the standard of liability to
"clear and convincing evidence" makes the jury more skeptical; so
much so that they now demand a showing that the actual prob-
ability of an accident was 50 percent in order to find the defen-
dant negligent. The defendant in this example will now properly
be exonerated, but the standard is so high that any defendant
who faced potential accidents with ex ante likelihoods of between
20 percent and 35 percent would be incorrectly found not liable. If
many more potential defendants in similar circumstances face ac-
cidents with likelihoods of between 20 percent and 35 percent
than face accidents with likelihoods of between 5 percent and 20
percent, then elevating the standard of proof to require "clear and
convincing evidence" will increase the number of incorrect re-
sults. Raising the standard creates the potential for more errors
in judgment than the hindsight bias caused. It is perhaps not
surprising then that courts do not manipulate the standard of
persuasion as a means of avoiding the hindsight bias.
B. Remedies for the Hindsight Bias in Specific Circumstances
The usual methods for promoting rational decisionmaking in
the courtroom are unlikely to eliminate the influence of the hind-
sight bias on judgments. Courts do not even attempt to issue in-
structions that might reduce the bias; they could not suppress
enough evidence to avoid the bias; and increasing the burden of
proof risks increasing the likelihood of error. This is not to say
that the courts are ignorant of the hindsight bias or completely
impotent to respond to it. In certain circumstances the courts can,
and do, use techniques to avoid rendering biased judgments or to
reduce the effect of the hindsight bias. Several examples support
'"Raising the standard to the criminal standard, "beyond a reasonable doubt,' would
probably have a similar, albeit greater, effect.
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the theory that courts do understand the hindsight bias and cor-
rect for it when it is possible to do so.
1. Compliance with ex ante norms.
A reliable judgment of reasonable care that was made before
an accident has occurred is sometimes available. Many customary
practices within an industry or a profession are attempts to iden-
tify precautions that constitute a reasonable level of care. So are
many government safety regulations. In such cases, rather than
conducting an open-ended inquiry into whether a defendant took
reasonable precautions, a court could assess whether the defen-
dant complied with the relevant custom or regulation. Under this
rule, only a determination that the defendant had not complied
with the ex ante norm could support a conclusion that the defen-
dant was negligent.'47 This decision rule would avoid the need to
determine ex post an ex ante probability, which an assessment of
reasonableness otherwise demands, thereby eliminating much of
the hindsight bias's influence on the judgment.4 '
Despite this advantage, the law does not recognize compli-
ance with either custom or regulation as a complete defense to li-
ability.4 ' Courts treat compliance with a custom or regulation as
evidence that a tort defendant's actions were not negligent, but
"The regulatory compliance defense has several supporters. See Richard C. Ausness,
The Case for a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 Md L Rev 1210, 1221-23, 1265-
67 (1996) (Administrative cost savings offset any negative effects in product safety or vic-
tim compensation.); James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Prod-
uct Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 NC L Rev 625, 625-26 (1978) (Integrity of the
judicial process depends on limiting products liability recovery.); Peter Huber, Safety and
the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 Colum L Rev
277, 329-35 (1985) (Regulatory agencies are best equipped for making ex ante reasonable-
ness determinations.). Professor Richard Epstein has provided the most vigorous argu-
ment for custom as a complete defense to liability. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The
T.J. Hooper- The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J Legal Stud 1, 6-11
(1992).
"The hindsight bias also might make it difficult for a defendant to establish that his
or her actions actually complied with the custom or regulation. See Arkes and Schipani, 73
Or L Rev at 597-601 (cited in note 8). A judge or jury, faced with an adverse outcome that,
psychologically, needs to be explained, might disregard the decision rule and simply find
the defendant negligent. If the hindsight bias operates this way, it would be hard or even
impossible to avoid its effects. There is no evidence, however, that the bias induces judges
or juries to disregard the decision rule.
" See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C ("Compliance with a legislative enactment
or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reason-
able man would take additional precautions."); id at § 295A ("In determining whether con-
duct is negligent, the customs of the community, or of others under like circumstances, are
factors to be taken into account but are not controlling where a reasonable man would not
follow them."). In contrast, the failure to comply with a regulation can constitute negli-
gence per se. See id at § 288B.
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courts independently assess the reasonableness of the defen-
dant's actions. 5 ' Merely introducing evidence that conduct com-
plied with custom or regulation might reduce the impact of the
hindsight bias, but, because the judge or jury still assesses the ex
ante probability of the adverse event, the bias will still influence
the judgment. But if the courts are aware of the influence of the
hindsight bias, why is compliance with custom or regulation not a
complete defense to liability? The reasons differ for custom and
regulatory compliance, but both have features that have led the
courts to reject them as substitutes for case-by-case determina-
tions of reasonableness.
Problems with the regulatory compliance defense arise prin-
cipally from the fact that federal agencies are the usual sources of
safety regulations. Although many federal statutes require an ex
ante judgment of what constitutes a reasonable level of safety, 5'
they might promote practices that do not constitute reasonable
care. An agency might be "captured" by an industry and produce
regulations that are overly sympathetic to the industry.'52 Even if
they are not captured, agencies are subject to intense political
pressures that often lead them to develop safety standards that
reflect political compromise, rather than a careful assessment of
safety.'53 Agencies also frequently lack the resources necessary to
set safety standards properly.'" Even if they can set appropriate
standards initially, regulatory agencies, subject to political pres-
sures and tight budgets, may be unable or unwilling to update
regulations as new technologies make more efficient precautions
available at lower cost. By contrast, "reasonableness" automati-
cally changes as better technology becomes available. The politi-
'See id at §§ 288C, 295A. See also The T.J. Hooper, 60 F2d 737, 740 (2d Cir 1932)
(opinion by Hand) ("Courts must in the end say what is required [to avoid negligence].").
Ironically, Judge Hand also suggested that custom could supplant the cost-benefit analy-
sis of negligence. See Carroll Towing, 159 F2d at 173.
"' See Ausness, 55 Md L Rev at 1214-17 (cited in note 147). Presumably, a regulatory
compliance defense would not apply to safety regulations that were not intended to ap-
proximate a reasonable level of care. See Henderson, 56 NC L Rev at 638-40 (cited in note
147). Many federal regulations, however, would meet this criteria. Ausness, 55 Md L Rev
at 1214-17 (cited in note 147).
'See Ausness, 55 Md L Rev at 1238 (cited in note 147); Clayton P. Gillette and James
E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U Pa L Rev 1027, 1064-69 (1990) (analyzing the
problem of industry "capture" of a regulatory agency); Richard B. Stewart, The Reforma-
tion of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv L Rev 1667, 1682-88 (1975) (documenting
widespread popular fear of industry "capture" phenomenon).
'See Ausness, 55 Md L Rev at 1238 (cited in note 147); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Pro-
gressive Law and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 Yale L J 341, 361-63
(1988) (documenting the compromises made in propounding OSHA standards).
See Thomas 0. McGarity, Reinventing rationality: The role of regulatory analysis in
the federal bureaucracy 126-42 (Cambridge 1991).
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cal and economic realities of agency functions mean that a strong
regulatory compliance defense risks freezing safety at potentially
inadequate levels of precautions, which become increasingly in-
adequate as technology improves.155
Federalism also cautions against widespread use of the
regulatory compliance defense. Federal law is the source of many
safety regulations, whereas state law governs common law tort
liability.5 ' The violation of a safety regulation constitutes negli-
gence per se, 57 but state courts are free to find a defendant who
has complied with federal safety regulations negligent. Thus, the
effect of the federal regulation is to set a floor on safety-state
laws may require a defendant to undertake even more precau-
tions in order to avoid liability. If regulatory compliance deter-
mines liability, however, then federal law would completely usurp
state tort law. Consequently, the decision as to whether compli-
ance with a safety regulation should be a complete defense to a
state tort action requires attention to the appropriate balance be-
tween the state and federal governments, 5 ' rather than to the
advantages of an ex ante norm as opposed to an ex post judg-
ment.
Compliance with custom is also a problematic defense. Cus-
tomary practices do not necessarily incorporate a reasonable level
of care.'59 They simply might reflect a habit or even result "from
the kind of inadvertence, carelessness, indifference, cost-paring
and corner cutting that is normally associated with negligence. " "
In some situations, however, an industry or profession faces
strong incentives to develop customs that represent an accurate
ex ante assessment of reasonable care. For example, even without
tort liability, manufacturers are likely to build safety precautions
into their products, because "[c]ustomers should be willing to pay
higher prices for the industry's product or service up to the point
where the last dollar spent buys just one dollar in accident cost
reduction."' Treating compliance with custom as a complete de-
fense to liability would avoid the hindsight bias. The courts, how-
ever, want to avoid inefficient customs. In the famous case of The
"See Ausness, 55 Md L Rev at 1238 (cited in note 147).
" See Erie Railroad Co v Tompkins, 304 US 64, 99-100 (1938).
... See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B.
'See Ausness, 55 Md L Rev at 1237-38 (cited in note 147); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The
Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L Rev 767, 804-12 (1994) (analyzing the federalism is-
sues relating to the preemption of tort claims).
'"See Eric Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U Pa L Rev 1697,
1705-10 (1996) (arguing that social norms have a tendency to generate inefficiency).
'"Keeton, et al, Prosser on Torts § 33 at 194 (cited in note 82).
..R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 168 (cited in note 6).
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T.J. Hooper,162 Judge Learned Hand held that a tug company's
failure to carry a radio on board could have been negligent, even
though, by custom, tugs at the time did not carry radios."8 Judge
Hand worried that "a whole calling may have unduly lagged in
the adoption of new and available devices. " "' Judge Hand ruled
that although an industry custom is relevant to a determination
as to whether a defendant was negligent, a court could find that a
defendant who complied with a custom was nevertheless negli-
gent." This holding and its eventual success in the common
law' 6 suggest that, at least as to custom, the courts have failed to
recognize the limitations of second-guessing an ex ante norm af-
ter an adverse event occurs.
Judicial skepticism of industry custom, however, probably
results from the limits of custom, rather than from ignorance of
the hindsight bias. Judge Posner's assertion that customers will
pressure manufacturers to offer products with efficient levels of
safety precautions depends upon a number of assumptions. An ef-
ficient custom is only likely to develop if the transaction costs be-
tween the entity that provides the product or service and every-
one who may be injured by the product or service are low."7 Even
if transaction costs are low, an efficient custom also requires that
customers have the same bargaining power, ability to identify ef-
ficient precautions, and risk preferences as the entity providing
the good or service." Few transactions have such characteristics
and these transactions will be rare and hard to identify. Conse-
quently, the cautious approach to custom that the courts have
followed makes economic sense. Furthermore, economic conse-
quences aside, courts may simply be unwilling to allow the ap-
'- 60 F2d 737, 740 (2d Cir 1932).
"But see Epstein, 21 J Legal Stud at 32-36 (cited in note 147) (arguing that the cus-
tom at the time favored the use of radios).
"'The T.J. Hooper, 60 F2d at 740. Law and economics scholars have questioned the
merits of this suggestion. Professor Epstein refers to this assertion as "perhaps the most
influential, and mischievous, sentence in the history of the law of torts." Epstein, 21 J Le-
gal Stud at 38 (cited in note 147).
'"The T.J. Hooper, 60 F2d at 740.
'"The rule that custom is relevant to the determination of negligence but is not con-
trolling has been adopted into the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 295A and is followed in
a majority ofjurisdictions. Epstein, 21 J Legal Stud at 38 (cited in note 147). A small mi-
nority of jurisdictions defer completely to custom and another small minority treat evi-
dence ofcustom as irrelevant. Id at 17-32.
'"See Landes and L Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 132-33 (cited in
note 108); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 168 (cited in note 6).
"
M See James A. Henderson, Jr. and John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the
Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 Cornell L Rev
1382, 1389-95 (1994) (arguing that the complexity of medical practice and the ignorance of
patients challenge the wisdom of relying on custom).
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parent negligence of everyone in a profession to absolve a single
member of fault.169
In one class of cases-medical malpractice--courts have ac-
knowledged that the profession's ex ante custom is probably su-
perior to their ex post judgment.7 ' Doctors who have followed
customary medical procedure are not to be considered negli-
gent.'7 ' The courts believe that the conditions necessary for the
development of efficient customs exist in the medical profes-
sion.72 This exception to the general rule shows that the courts do
distrust the value of second-guessing ex ante decisions. However,
there are reasons other than the hindsight bias to treat a medical
custom as reasonable per se. The medical profession has more
expertise than the courts at determining appropriate treat-
ments'73 and has sufficient economic incentives to develop cus-
toms that reflect due care. 74 The inaccuracy of judging in hind-
sight is yet another strike against the institutional competence of
the courts.
The refusal to rely more heavily on either regulatory compli-
.ance or custom presents a lost opportunity to avoid a biased as-
l"See Keeton, et al, Prosser on Torts § 33 at 194-95 (cited in note 82).
..See Landes and R. Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 137 (cited in note
108); Keeton, et al, Prosser on Torts § 32 at 189 (cited in note 82). Other professionals are
liable if their conduct fails to conform to that of a "reasonable" member of the profession,
see Keeton, et al, Prosser on Torts § 24 at 145, leaving them subject to the hindsight bias.
In a medical malpractice case in which there is no relevant custom, a determination of li-
ability would be influenced by the hindsight bias as well.
"See, for example, Hood v Phillips, 554 SW2d 160, 165 (Tex 1977) ("A physician who
undertakes a mode or form of treatment which a reasonable and prudent member of the
medical profession would undertake... shall not be subject to liability."). But see Helling
v Carey, 83 Wash 2d 514, 519 P2d 981, 983 (1974) (finding an opthamologist liable for
failing to give a glaucoma test to a young plaintiff, even though medical practice opposed
giving the test). The case is probably a rare exception to the general rule that adherence to
customary treatments cannot be negligent. See Neil Meltzer, Comment, Helling v. Carey:
Landmark or Exception in Medical Malpractice, 11 New Eng L Rev 301, 303-07 (1975).
Curiously, the Helling case is one in which medical custom was not supported by a cost-
benefit analysis. See William B. Schwartz and Neil K. Komesar, Doctors, Damages, and
Deterrence: An Economic View of Medical Malpractice, 298 New Eng J Med 1282, 1283
(1978) (concluding that under the circumstances in the case, a glaucoma test cost $5, but
saved $27 in expected losses). The court, in Helling, did not rely on this cost-benefit analy-
sis, but, had it done so, it would have been able to rely on fairly precise ex ante estimates
for costs and benefits rather than subjective ones. This might have enabled it to avoid the
hindsight bias. To the extent that any ambiguity in ex ante estimates exists, however, the
hindsight bias would probably re-emerge as an influence on judgment.
"See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 168-69 (cited in note 6). But see
Henderson and Siliciano, 79 Cornell L Rev at 1389-1400 (cited in note 168) (arguing that
courts' assumption that appropriate custom will develop in medical practice may be incor-
rect).
'" See Keeton, et al, Prosser on Torts § 33 at 192-95 (cited in note 82).
"'See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 169 (cited in note 6).
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sessment of liability, especially in the case of custom.' 5 Professor
Epstein and Judge Posner have argued that, in circumstances in
which custom is likely to reflect reasonable care, allowing courts
to make their own judgments can only lead to wasteful mis-
takes.7" Analysis of the hindsight bias shows that the situation is
even worse than that; a defendant who has followed industry cus-
tom is likely to be found liable, especially because customs proba-
bly do not incorporate an excess of care.' There are, however,
good reasons to suppose that regulations and customs might not
actually reflect an appropriate analysis of reasonable precau-
tions. Where there is strong reason to believe that the ex ante
norm is identical to reasonable care, as in the case of medical
malpractice, the courts have relied on it as a gauge of negligence
that is superior to their ex post judgments. Furthermore, treating
compliance with regulation or custom as relevant evidence of rea-
sonable care might mitigate some of the hindsight bias's impact
on the negligence determination. In effect, the common law does
the best that it can in response to the fallibility of judging in
hindsight and the inadequacy of custom and regulation as substi-
tutes for ex ante assessments of reasonable care.
2. Good evidence of an ex ante assessment: the case of
patent law.
Hindsight problems are not restricted to the common law.
The federal courts, for example, have long struggled with the
problem of judging the validity of patents in hindsight and have
worked to develop a sensible resolution to the hindsight bias. For
a device or technique to merit patent protection, it must not only
be novel and useful, it must actually be an invention-it must be
a "nonobvious" advance in an art."' A patent requires more "skill
and ingenuity" than that possessed by an "ordinary mechanic ac-
quainted with the business."' 9 Congress codified this require-
ment in 1952:
'Although he was not referring to the hindsight bias, Professor Henderson remarked
that "to reject the use of... [safety] regulations as a standard... is to miss an important
opportunity to render more consistent and rational the patterns of decisions in many
product areas." Henderson, 66 NC L Rev at 639 (cited in note 147).
"Epstein, 21 J Leg Stud at 38 (cited in note 147); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law at 168 (cited in note 6).
1
.Competitive pressures would likely keep the industry from taking more precautions
than they need to avoid liability.
"See Ernest Bainbridge Lipscomb III, Libscomb's Walker on Patents § 6.1 at 4 (Law
Co-op 3d ed 1985).
"'Hotchkiss v Greenwood, 52 US (11 How) 248, 267 (1850). For example, the patent at
issue in Hotchkiss was for a ceramic doorknob. The Court deemed this an obvious innova-
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A patent may not be obtained... if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains.8 0
According to the Supreme Court, to determine nonobviousness,
"the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; dif-
ferences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art re-
solved." 8' In short, nonobviousness depends upon whether the
"invention" represents a technological advance "beyond the skill
of the calling."'82
The determination of nonobviousness is likely to be affected
by the hindsight bias, although this has not been tested empiri-
cally." Even a truly novel idea might seem obvious after it has
been revealed. The law requires that nonobviousness be deter-
mined "at the time the invention was made,""' although "hind-
sight is often difficult to avoid in determining obviousness of in-
ventions." 8' Courts have recognized the problem of hindsight and
have expressed concern that they "must be continually on guard
against the natural tendency to treat as obvious something which
appears simple in the light of hindsight, but which may not actu-
ally have been so at the time of the invention."' 8
Partly in response to the influence of hindsight, the Supreme
Court added "secondary considerations" to the test for nonobvi-
ousness. In addition to the inquiry into the technical aspects of
the invention, the Court also requires lower courts to analyze
tion. Id.
1-35 USC § 103(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
... Graham v John Deere Co, 383 US 1, 17 (1966).
" Id at 15 n 7.
See the discussion of the hindsight bias and foreseeability in Part H.B.3.
1835 USC § 103(a).
"IEllicott Machine Corp v United States, 405 F2d 1385, 1390 (Ct Cl 1969).
" Teleflex Inc v American Chain & Cable Co, 273 F Supp 573, 587 (S D NY 1967). See
also Kz Manufacturing Co v Northern Electric Co, 412 F Supp 470, 484 (S D NY 1976)
(referring to hindsight as "convenient but misleading"); Borden, Inc v Occidental Petro-
leum Corp, 381 F Supp 1178, 1205 (S D Tex 1974) ("Obviousness can[not]... be resolved
through ... analysis distorted by... retrospective self-evidence or hindsight."); Erie Tech-
nological Products, Inc v Die Craft Metal Products, Inc, 318 F Supp 933, 936 (N D Ill
1970), modified on other grounds, 461 F2d 5 (7th Cir 1972) ("In determining whether a
patent is invalid for obviousness, a court must guard against... slipping into hindsight.").
The most extreme statement on hindsight was made in Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp v
Nordson Corp, 293 F Supp 448, 482 (N D 111 1968) ("[I-Ilindsight is of no value in deter-
mining what would have been obvious at the time the invention was made.").
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"such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt
but unsolved need, failure of others, etc., [that] might be utilized
to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the
subject matter sought to be patented."8 ' The Court observed that
determining nonobviousness by reference to these secondary con-
siderations helps courts avoid conducting a technical inquiry that
they might be incompetent to undertake, and "guard[s] against
slipping into the use of hindsight."'88 The mere fact of an inven-
tion will not color a court's evaluation of the evidence of the in-
vention's commercial success or its resolution of a long-felt unre-
solved need, whereas the mere fact of the invention might make
the inventor's technical achievements seem obvious. Secondary
characteristics have grown in importance since the Court first in-
troduced them into the test for nonobviousness. The Federal Cir-
cuit ultimately held that an inquiry into secondary characteris-
tics may, by itself, support the conclusion that an invention was
not obvious.'89 Thus, rather than make a technical evaluation of
how the inventor arrived at his or her alleged innovation, courts
determining nonobviousness may look to considerations that are
not as susceptible to the hindsight bias. 90
The situation here resembles medical malpractice. Part of
the reason that courts rely on custom in medical malpractice and
secondary evidence of nonobviousness in patent law is a recogni-
tion of their limited ability to understand technical or scientific
subject matters raised by such cases, but the courts also recog-
nize that judgments made in hindsight are biased.' The law, in
both cases, represents an attempt to find reliable ex ante evi-
dence of an appropriate judgment, so that trial courts need not
rely on judgments made in hindsight that are influenced by out-
come knowledge.
3. No "liability by hindsight."
Although no general remedy for the hindsight bias is avail-
able, courts have used the burden of production to blunt the bene-
'Graham, 383 US at 17-18.
" Id at 36, quoting Monroe Auto Equipment Co v Heckthorn Manufacturing & Supply
Co, 332 F2d 406, 412 (6th Cir 1964).
" Vandenberg v Dairy Equipment Co, 740 F2d 1560, 1567 (Fed Cir 1984).
'See Dorothy Whelan, Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondary Considerations in Ap-
plying the Section 103 Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 BC L Rev 357, 360-65
(1987) (discussing the case law and questioning the use of certain secondary characteris-
tics).
"'The bias is especially pernicious in an unfamiliar context. See Christensen-
Szalanaski and Willham, 48 Org Beh & Human Decision Processes at 154-55 (cited in note
2).
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fit that the hindsight bias confers upon plaintiffs in negligence
cases. Because of the bias, a plaintiff could rely exclusively on the
mere fact of an adverse outcome to convince a judge or jury that
the defendant's actions were negligent. To prevent this possibil-
ity, courts require more evidence than the mere fact of injury.'92
As the Oregon Supreme Court described this doctrine: "With
hindsight's 20/20 vision, it is easy to see that [the defendant]
should have foreseen.., a risk to the public at large. [But, p]roof
aided by hindsight ... is insufficient to establish negligence.""'
As a general matter, "[tihe mere fact that an accident or an injury
has occurred, with nothing more, is not evidence of negligence on
the part of anyone."94
The federal courts have adopted a particularly vigorous pro-
hibition against liability based solely on hindsight in cases alleg-
ing violations of the federal securities laws.'95 To win a federal se-
curities case, a plaintiff must allege and prove that a defendant
has intentionally misrepresented material facts about a publicly
traded company in an effort to defraud investors.'96 As in all
fraud cases, in order to survive a motion to dismiss brought under
Rule 9(b), plaintiffs must make additional allegations of specific
instances of intended fraud.'97 Courts have held that, in a case of
alleged securities fraud, this heightened pleading requirement
means that a plaintiff must do more than merely allege that some
'See Keeton, et al, Prosser on Torts § 39 at 242 (cited in note 82). In cases in which
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable, however, the plaintiff need only demonstrate
that an adverse outcome occurred. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D; Keeton, et
al, Prosser on Torts § 39 at 242 (cited in note 82).
'"Cain v RUken, 300 Or 706, 720, 717 P2d 140, 149 (1986).
",Keeton, et al, Prosser on Torts § 39 at 242 (cited in note 82).
'"Securities Act of 1933, Pub L No 73-38, 48 Stat 74, codified at 15 USC §§ 77a-77z
(1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub L No 73-404, 48 Stat 881, codified at 15 USC
§§ 78a-7811 (1994). See D. Brian Hufford, Deterring Fraud vs. Avoiding the "Strike Suit":.
Reaching an Appropriate Balance, 61 Brooklyn L Rev 593, 605-06 (1995) ("Courts have
been especially aggressive in dismissing cases that merely plead 'fraud by hindsight"');
Robert A. Prentice and John H. Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the
Securities Fraud Liability of High-Tech Companies, 8 Harv J L & Tech 1, 25 (1994)
("Courts generally have been careful to prevent plaintiffs from alleging 'fraud by hind-
sight.").
'See Basic, Inc v Levinson, 485 US 224, 231 (1988) (stating the elements of a viola-
tion of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
' FRCP 9(b). This Rule requires that a complaint alleging fraud must describe the
particular circumstances of the alleged fraud. See Charles A. Wright and Arthur L. Miller,
5 Federal Practice and Procedure 1297 (West 1990). Rule 9(b) has been used extensively in
federal securities cases. See Alexander, 43 Stan L Rev at 524-28 (cited in note 93). Since
few of these cases go to trial, the merits of these cases are fought in pre-trial motion prac-
tice. See id. As a consequence, the "fraud-by-hindsight" doctrine is raised earlier in securi-
ties cases than it would be in a tort suit. For example, note that the prohibition against
relying exclusively on hindsight in Cain, 717 P2d at 142, arose in the context of a sum-
mary judgment motion.
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prediction made by the defendant ultimately failed to come
true.9 ' "There is no 'fraud by hindsight.""'9 However, plaintiffs
who can allege specific circumstances of fraud in addition to the
defendants' failed predictions still benefit from the courts' judging
in hindsight.2" The "fraud by hindsight" doctrine guards only
against a severe abuse of the hindsight bias; it does not entirely
purge the system of the bias's influence.
4. Subsequent remedial measures.
Although suppressing evidence is not generally a useful way
to avoid the influence of the hindsight bias, courts can sometimes
suppress evidence that would, if admitted, exacerbate the bias's
impact on the judgment. For example, the rule that a defendant's
post-accident remedial measures are not admissible to prove
negligence 0 ' can be traced to the hindsight bias. Injurers often
update their safety precautions after an accident, and wisely so.
An accident can teach an injurer much about how to avoid caus-
ing future harm. Nevertheless, such subsequent remedial meas-
ures are almost irrelevant to a determination as to whether the
defendant was negligent with respect to the initial accident. 2
These measures only reveal insights gleaned from the adverse
outcome itself and do not speak to what was predictable before-
hand.
The liberal rules of relevance in contemporary evidence law,
however, probably support admitting evidence that a defendant
has taken subsequent remedial measures.0 3 Defendants should,
'See William S. Feinstein, Pleading Securities Fraud With Particularity-Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) in the Rule 10b-5 Context: Kowal v. MCI Communications
Corporation, 63 Geo Wash L Rev 851, 857-58 (1995) (noting courts' reluctance to admit
"fraud by hindsight" without supporting evidence); Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities
Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 Ariz L Rev 675, 684 (1996)
(discussing whether requiring that fraud be plead with particularity deters "fraud by
hindsight" claims).
'Dileo v Ernst & Young, 901 F2d 624, 628 (7th Cir 1990), quoting Denny v Barber,
576 F2d 465, 470 (2d Cir 1978) (opinion by Friendly).
'This assumes that the hindsight bias implicates subjective standards. See discus-
sion in Part U.B.2.
" See FRE 407; David P. Leonard, Selected Rules of Limited Admissibility, The New
Wigmore §§ 2.3.4, 2.5 (Little, Brown 1996) (Only two states, Maine and Rhode Island,
regularly admit such evidence to prove negligence.). Subsequent remedial measures are
admissible for other purposes, "such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precau-
tionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment." FRE 407.
'The relevance of subsequent remedial measures to negligence has been a point of
some debate, but the debate is about whether they are relevant at all. See Leonard, Se-
lected Rules of Limited Admissibility at §§ 2.2, 2.3.1 (providing an account of both sides of
the argument).
'See FRE 407 Advisory Committee's Note (Adopting a subsequent remedial measure
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in principle, have no fear of this evidence. If the evidence that the
defendant took subsequent remedial measures is virtually irrele-
vant, then a rational factfinder should give it no weight. The evi-
dence should have no effect on the outcome.
Nevertheless, courts have worried that evidence that the de-
fendant has taken subsequent remedial measures will have a
dramatic effect on a jury.' They worry that juries will mistak-
enly assume that "because the world gets wiser as it gets older,
therefore it was foolish before." 5 This is essentially an assertion
that juries' assessments of defendants' adoption of subsequent
remedial measures will be influenced by the hindsight bias. If ju-
ries do overreact to the defendant taking subsequent remedial
measures, then defendants will be loath to undertake them. The
increased probability of paying for the accident that already oc-
curred might overwhelm the benefits to the defendant of reducing
the prospects of future liability, at least until the trial is over.
Courts worry that admitting evidence of subsequent remedial
measures would induce juries to hold defendants liable when they
actually took reasonable care. This would discourage defendants
from taking subsequent remedial measures. To avoid this prob-
lem, courts have deemed such evidence inadmissible.2 6
In cases involving subsequent remedial measures, the courts
suppress evidence that would magnify the hindsight bias's influ-
ence on the judgment, thereby averting an unwanted incentive
structure. Admitting such evidence would not only leave the de-
fendant subject to the ordinary version of the hindsight bias-the
accident occurred, so the defendant's actions appear less reason-
able than they would in foresight-but it also would tempt the
jury with more detailed evidence of the consequences of the de-
fendant's initial decision. The fact of the accident cannot realisti-
cally be suppressed, but evidence that would aggravate the bias
can be. Courts' response to the problem of subsequent remedial
measures reveals a good understanding of the hindsight bias and
the judicial ability to respond to it.
"is not in fact an admission" of fault, but "[uinder a liberal theory of relevancy, this ground
alone would not support exclusion as the inference is still a possible one.").
'See Leonard, Selected Rules of Limited Admissibility § 2.2 at 2-14 (cited in note
201).
'Hart v The Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co, 21 LTR (ns) 261, 263 (Exch 1869).
'See, for example, Flaminio v Honda Motor Co, 733 F2d 463, 471 (7th Cir 1984)
(opinion by Posner) ("It is only because juries are believed to overreact to evidence of sub-
sequent remedial measures that the admissibility of such evidence could deter defendants
from taking such measures.").
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C. Adopting a "No Liability" Rule
The courts have thus proven remarkably adept at pursuing
opportunities to avoid or reduce the impact of the hindsight bias
on judgments of liability. These opportunities are restricted to
isolated circumstances, however, and the lack of a generally ap-
plicable remedy leaves a great many cases subject to the bias's in-
fluence. In some circumstances, the adverse consequences of bi-
ased judgments are both unavoidable and intolerable. In these
situations, rather than subject defendants to biased judgments of
liability, the best option might be to refuse to hold defendants li-
able-even if their actions seem negligent in hindsight. A rule of
"no liability" might have fewer adverse consequences than a rule
of negligence judged in hindsight. Indeed, in certain situations,
courts have adopted just such a rule.
The best example of such a situation is probably the business
judgment rule in corporate law. The business judgment rule re-
fers to the standard for judicial review of decisions by corporate
officers and directors. °7 The rule varies across jurisdictions0 8 and
is difficult to state precisely,"' but an officer or director who is in-
formed about a transaction being undertaken by the corporation,
and is not an interested party in the transaction, "fulfills his duty
[of care to the shareholders] if... he rationally believes that his
business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation."210
Officer and directors who satisfy the elements of the rule' are
'See Dennis J. Block, Nancy E. Barton, and Stephen A. Radin, The Business Judg-
ment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors and Officers 3-4 (Prentice Hall 2d ed
1988).
'See E. Norman Veasey and Julie M.S. Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Re-
vised Model Act, The Trans Union Case, and the American Law Institute Project-A
Strange Porridge, 63 Tex L Rev 1483, 1484-97 (1985) (discussing different formulations of
the business judgment rule).
"See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or
Misguided Notion?, 67 S Cal L Rev 287, 289 (1994) ("Defining the business judgment rule
is no easy task.").
"'American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recom-
mendations § 4.01(c) at 177-78 (ALI 1991). The hindsight bias might affect the ex post as-
sessment of whether a decision was "rational." However, the standard of liability under
the business judgment rule is so low that even judgments in hindsight are unlikely to ever
lead to a finding of liability under this standard.
... The basic elements of the business judgment rule are: (1) business decision, (2) dis-
interest and independence, (3) due care to make an informed choice, (4) no bad faith, and
(5) no abuse of discretion. See Block, Barton, and Radin, The Business Judgment Rule at
12-22. The rule of course supplies no protection otherwise. Id at 12. See also Joy v North,
692 F2d 880, 886 (2d Cir 1982) ("The business judgment rule ... does not apply in cases,
e.g., in which the corporate judgment lacks a business purpose, is tainted by conflict of in-
terest ... is so egregious as to amount to a no-win decision .... or results from obvious
and prolonged failure to exercise oversight or supervision.").
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not liable to the shareholders for decisions that turn out badly-
even if these decisions seem negligent in hindsight.212 "Whereas
automobile drivers who make a mistake in judgment . . . will
likely be called upon to respond in damages, a corporate officer
who makes a mistake in judgment . .. will rarely, if ever, be
found liable for damages suffered by the corporation."21 Under
the business judgment rule, "director liability is predicated upon
concepts of gross negligence."2 4 Even "gross negligence" is a
somewhat more stringent standard of review than courts com-
monly use to scrutinize business decisions;2 5 many courts have
adopted standards that are even more deferential to the decisions
of corporate managers.216
But is judicial deference to business decisions attributable to
the hindsight bias? There are several justifications for the rule,
but the principal ones boil down to the relative institutional com-
petence of corporate managers as compared to the courts.2 7 Cor-
porate managers have much more expertise than courts at mak-
ing business decisions 21 -a justification that has nothing to do
"See, for example, Louisiana World Exposition v Federal Insurance Co, 864 F2d 1147,
1151 (5th Cir 1989) ("Simple negligence alone is insufficient for a finding of personal li-
ability of an officer or director to the corporation."); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks
and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers,
77 Yale L J 1078, 1099 (1968) ("The search for cases in which directors of industrial corpo-
rations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by self-
dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack.").
SJoy, 692 F2d at 885 (citations omitted).
.. 'Aronson v Lewis, 473 A2d 805, 812 (Del 1984).
... See Block, Barton, and Radin, The Business Judgment Rule at 63-64 (cited in note
207).
216 See, for example, Gearhart Industries, Inc v Smith International, Inc, 741 F2d 707,
721 (5th Cir 1984) ("Texas courts... will not impose liability upon a noninterested corpo-
rate director unless the challenged action is ultra vires or tainted by fraud."). See also
Marcia M. McMurray, Note, A Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loy-
alty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 Vand L Rev 605, 614-16 (1987) (discussing vari-
ous standards). The standard of review for "gross negligence" likewise applies only to the
decisionmaking process, not to the substantive decision, which receives more deferential
treatment. See Veasey and Seitz, 63 Tex L Rev at 1486-87 (cited in note 208). The Dela-
ware legislature was even unhappy with the "gross negligence" standard. After the Dela-
ware Supreme Court adopted the "gross negligence" standard in Aronson, 473 A2d at 812,
and Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858, 873 (Del 1985), the legislature lowered the stan-
dard so as to give corporate managers even more discretion. See Arkes and Schipani, 73
Or L Rev at 618 (cited in note 8).
"7Other justifications include the effort to promote managerial control over share-
holder control of the corporation and the relatively unsympathetic position of the share-
holders, who are usually free to dispose of their ownership interest in the corporation if
they feel that the management is incompetent. See Block, Barton, and Radin, The Busi-
ness Judgment Rule at 7-11 (cited in note 207); McMurray, 40 Vand L Rev at 616-17;
Ralph A- Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corpo-
ration, 60 Notre Dame L Rev 456, 483-85 (1985).
"'See Auerbach v Bennett, 47 NY2d 619, 630, 419 NYS2d 920, 926, 393 NE2d 994,
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with the hindsight bias. Expertise, however, is not a sufficient ac-
count of the business judgment rule; the courts have no problem
holding other experts, such as lawyers and accountants, liable for
negligent decisions. 19 Courts evaluating business decisions also
mistrust their perspective:
[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most im-
perfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions. The
circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not eas-
ily reconstructed in a courtroom years later .... [A] rea-
soned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch
viewed years later against a background of perfect knowl-
edge.22
0
The business judgment rule arises from the concern that even a
good decision can produce an undesirable result and can be
judged unfairly in hindsight. "Courts recognize that even disin-
terested, well-intentioned, informed directors can make decisions
that, in hindsight, were improvident."2 '
This rationale, however, also applies to potential tort defen-
dants, especially in cases of professional liability.' Indeed, the
similarities between corporate managers and other professionals
are striking.2 ' All professionals could merit deference from judi-
cial second-guessing of their decisions, particularly as this sec-
ond-guessing is done in hindsight. Nevertheless, both equitable
and economic factors provide grounds for distinguishing the busi-
ness judgment context from other professional liability. Immu-
nizing professionals from liability for negligence would create a
greater injustice for potential plaintiffs than the business judg-
ment rule inflicts upon shareholders. Shareholders can fire in-
competent managers either directly through a shareholder vote,
or indirectly by selling their holdings in the corporation.' Al-
1000 (1979) ("The business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is grounded on the prudent
recognition that courts are ill equipped... to evaluate what are and must be essentially
business judgments."); Joseph Hinsey, IV, Business Judgment and the American Law In-
stitute's Corporate Governance Project: the Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 Geo
Wash L Rev 609, 612 (1984) (recognizing the courts' tendency to defer to managerial dis-
cretion).
219 See, for example, Gevurtz, 67 S Cal L Rev at 305 (cited in note 209). Courts do defer
somewhat to doctors by allowing a defense based on compliance with customary medical
practice. See Part V.B.1.
'Joy, 692 F2d at 886.
"'Washington Bancorp v Said, 812 F Supp 1256, 1267-68 (D DC 1993).
'See Arkes and Schipani, 73 Or L Rev at 621-29 (cited in note 8) (comparing the li-
ability of corporate managers to doctors).
'See Gevurtz, 67 S Cal L Rev at 288 (cited in note 209) (using these similarities to
extend Judge Hand's cost-benefit analysis for negligence to business decisions).
'See Peeples, 60 Notre Dame L Rev at 461 (cited in note 217) ("Courts have deferred
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though patients and clients can fire incompetent lawyers or ac-
countants, the harm that is inflicted in the meantime may be
more personally significant.225 Incompetent managers will only
cost shareholders their money, after all. To be sure, this distinc-
tion is a slight over-generalization-the loss of a personal in-
vestment in a business could exceed the financial loss from legal
or accounting malpractice.226 Shareholders, however, can diversify
their risk of loss in a manner that is not possible in the profes-
sional service context.227 The likely nature of the damages in each
context distinguishes corporate liability from the liability of other
professionals.
Economic grounds provide a better explanation for the differ-
ent liability standards in corporate governance as opposed to
other professions. The bias converts the negligence standard into
a quasi-strict liability rule, which if applied to corporate manag-
ers would either induce them to take an excess of precautions or
to act as if they operated under a system of strict liability. If it
mimicked strict liability, then fewer people would be willing to
become corporate managers than if they were subject to an unbi-
ased negligence system.' This concern might account for the
business judgment rule, and it does run through the early busi-
ness judgment cases in the nineteenth century."
Furthermore, the possibility that quasi-strict liability would
create incentives to take an excess of precautions would under-
mine the basic functioning of corporate managers more severely
than other professionals. Investors want corporate managers to
make risk-neutral business decisions, because investors already
control their overall investment risk through diversification. 2s0
Ensuring that managers effectively represent this concern and do
not avoid business decisions that have a high expected payoff but
also carry a high degree of risk is a central problem of corporate
governance." 1 Liability for negligence judged in hindsight would
to managerial decisions because of the assumption that the shareholder has an alternate
course of action: selling the interest in the corporation.").
See Arkes and Schipani, 73 Or L Rev at 623 (cited in note 8).
'See Gevurtz, 67 S Cal L Rev at 312-14 (cited in note 209).
'See text accompanying notes 230-3 1.
'This is because even though strict liability and negligence are equally efficient,
strict liability may decrease activity levels by placing the entire cost on the potential de-
fendant. R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 175-80 (cited in note 6).
'See, for example, Briggs v Spaulding, 141 US 132, 148-49 (1891); Godbold v The
Branch Bank, 11 Ala 191, 199 (1847); Percy v Millaudon, 8 Mart (ns) 68, 77-78 (La 1829);
Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa 11, 24 (1872); Hodges v New England Screw Co, 1 RI 312, 346-47
(1850).
See Joy, 692 F2d at 886 n 6.
22 See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 405 (cited in note 6).
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only exacerbate this problem. Investors do not need the security
of being able to hold their managers strictly liable, and they cer-
tainly do not want them taking an excess of precautions against
losses. As the court in Joy v North" put it: "[Ilt is very much in
the interests of shareholders that the law not create incentives
for overly cautious corporate decisions." We might want lawyers
or accountants to guarantee their work with a system of de facto
strict liability, or take an occasional excess of precautions, but
corporate managers operating under such a regime will be apt to
betray the real interests of their shareholders.
Without the hindsight bias, it is difficult to explain why cor-
porate managers are immune from liability for negligence and
other professionals are not. Arguably, all professionals have suffi-
cient incentives to avoid negligent conduct-they need to do so in
order to retain their patients or clients. Therefore, all profession-
als could argue that they should be immune from liability for
negligent conduct. Alternatively, professionals have much more
information than their clients, patients, and shareholders, and
are in the best position to reduce the social costs of their actions.
Therefore, all professionals (corporate managers included) should
be subject to liability. When negligence judged in hindsight is re-
vealed to be a system of quasi-strict liability, however, the dis-
tinction becomes clear. Strict liability is a perfectly defensible,
even laudable, form of liability-it creates incentives to be effi-
cient and spreads the risk of injury, reducing the possibility that
a single individual will experience a catastrophic loss. But
adopting a system of strict liability raises the costs of any activ-
ity, which might create some unwanted consequences. The conse-
quences of a system of strict liability are particularly undesirable
to shareholders in a corporation. Shareholders already spread
their risks through diversification and, even without a system of
quasi-strict liability, they must worry that their managers make
risk-averse decisions. With decades of experience in the matter
and a basic understanding of the foibles of judging in hindsight,
courts seem to have realized this, and carved out the business
judgment rule for corporate managers alone among professionals.
D. Summary of Adaptations
Remedies for the hindsight bias are situation specific, but
some generalizations can be made. The four specific instances
identified in this Article in which courts have developed proce-
692 F2d 880, 886 (2d Cir 1982).
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dures to mitigate the impact of the hindsight bias on judgment,
along with the development of the business judgment rule, reveal
two basic patterns. First, the courts try to keep information that
could not have been known ex ante out of the process of ex post
judgment. In negligence cases, they suppress evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures because it reflects the defendant's un-
derstanding after an accident, not before. In patent cases, they
refrain from reanalyzing the patent's advances and look only to
ex ante circumstances such as whether the patent fulfilled a long-
felt unresolved need. Second, the law tends to enforce the ex ante
understanding between the parties, if there is one. In the case of
medical malpractice, the doctor is not a guarantor of recovery. A
patient does not purchase a promise of good health, but pur-
chases the "customary" medical treatment. Doctors who fail to
deliver the customary treatment have not fulfilled their end of
the bargain, and hence are subject to liability. Likewise, invest-
ment in a corporation does not guarantee a positive return; it is a
gamble on the abilities of the officers and directors of the corpora-
tion. The ex ante bargain is only that the management will re-
main informed and not engage in self-dealing.
The legal system is, in some ways, trapped in a second best
world. Judgments tainted by the hindsight bias have costs. They
can induce an excess of precautions and smack of unfairness. But
the courts have responded to these concerns. They have devel-
oped two basic responses-suppressing post-event information
and enforcing ex ante arrangements-that are remarkably ele-
gant methods of blunting the impact of the hindsight bias. Al-
though the legal system must tolerate biased judgments, the
courts occasionally mitigate their adverse consequences.
CONCLUSION: LIABILITY IN A SYSTEM OF SECOND-BEST
JUDGMENTS
The legal system has a good understanding of the hindsight
bias and its effects on judging liability after the fact. Generic de-
biasing strategies are unlikely to be available and the courts do
not attempt to use them. Instead they have developed mecha-
nisms for taking advantage of specific circumstances that allow
them to reduce the influence of the hindsight bias. In those cases
in which the bias cannot be avoided, the courts have pursued sen-
sible second-best strategies that are sensitive to the consequences
of biased judgments for both economics and justice.
The story of the hindsight bias in legal judgments has les-
sons for legal policymakers. It holds a warning about developing
a new area of law that demands a judgment in hindsight. Any
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new area will have to make some accommodation for the bias. For
example, in 1983, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
was amended to require sanctioning of those who file frivolous
lawsuits or motions within a lawsuit. 3 Frivolousness is difficult
to define,2 and the 1983 version of the rule couched its definition
in terms of reasonablenessY5 Of course, reasonableness can be
determined only after a lawsuit has failed or is dismissed, mak-
ing it difficult to judge what was reasonable beforehand. It is not
clear how the courts have resolved the problems associated with
judging litigation in hindsight for frivolousness, but it is safe to
say that there has been some dissatisfaction with the 1983
amendments-some of which led to substantial revisions in
1993Y Ultimately, if the federal courts want to sanction frivo-
lous litigation, they will have to devise some means of addressing
the problem of judging in hindsight, as they have in many other
areas of law.
The development of rules on judging liability in hindsight
speaks to two different schools of legal theory-law and econom-
ics and law and psychology. To the law and economics commu-
nity, especially those developing positive theories of law, it shows
not only that a cognitive bias can persist in the system, but that
the system itself can recognize the bias and adapt to it. In fact, a
legal academic armed with an understanding of the limits of hu-
man judgment is in a better position to explain the pattern of
case law than one without such an understanding. The business
judgment rule and subsequent remedial measures rules, for ex-
ample, make a great deal of sense as a response to hindsight
bias." As for the law and psychology tradition, a close look at the
legal system's response to the bias suggests that the law is well-
equipped to address the cognitive limitations of judges and juries.
Although an understanding of cognitive biases may reveal pat-
terns in the case law, not every bias needs a new reform. The law
might have figured it out all on its own.
'FRCP 11(b) 1983 Amendments.
See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U Pa L Rev 519, 529-33 (1997).
'FRCP 11(b) 1983 Amendments.
FRCP 11(b) 1993 Amendments.
'Law and economics scholars have theories explaining each of these. These rest
largely on the possibility of errors or judicial incompetence relative to corporate managers.
However, a large part of judicial incompetence is not fear of random error but systematic
biases, such as the hindsight bias.
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